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THE PENDULUM OF JUSTICE: ANALYZING THE INDIGENT 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
WHEN PLEADING NOT GUILTY AT THE PLEA BARGAINING STAGE 
TARA HARRISON* 
I. INTRODUCTION: AN ISSUE WITH Two STRONG POSITIONS 
On October 9,2001, members of the Silent Aryan Warriors kidnapped a man 
in Salt Lake County.! The warriors covered his head and upper torso with a sheet, 
wrapped his wrists and ankles with duct tape, and drove him to a rural area.2 One 
warrior dragged the man thirty feet off the road and dropped an eighty-three pound 
rock on his head, killing him.3 The police, fortunately, found the warrior who 
committed the murder. The State prosecuted him, and a jury convicted him.4 The 
court then sentenced him to consecutive prison terms of five years to life and 
fifteen years to life.5 
The criminal justice system was unable to prevent the tragic death of an 
innocent man, but succeeded in finding and eventually sentencing the individual 
responsible. Citizens reflecting on this situation could feel a sense of satisfaction in 
an effective system. 
However, the convicted defendant has appealed his conviction,6 not on the 
issue of guilt or innocence, nor on the issue of receiving a fair trial, but rather on 
the amount of time he is required to serve in prison. He has not questioned the 
sentencing guidelines; rather, he has questioned the competence of his attorney 
prior to trial. He argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed 
to conduct a reasonable pretrial investigation.7 The defendant asserts that this 
failure prejudiced him because it deprived him of the benefit of a plea bargain.8 In 
other words, he would have pled guilty and thereby received a lighter sentence if 
his counsel had performed a more thorough investigation of the strength of the 
State's case. 
In courts across the country, other defendants have raised the same claim, 
ineffective assistance of counsel at plea bargaining, for varying reasons: counsel 
* Staff Member, Utah lAw Review.
 
1 Brief of Respondent at 3, State v. Grueber, 2005 UT App 480U.
 
2 I d.
 
3 I d.
 
4 I d. at 2.
 
5 Id.
 
6 The Utah Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the State. State v. Grueber, 2005 UT 
App 480U. However, the Utah Supreme Court has granted certiorari, State v. Grueber, 133 
P.3d 437 (Utah 2006). 
7 Grueber, 2005 UT App 480U. 
8 I d. 
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failed to convey a plea offer,9 counsel rejected a plea offer without defendant's 
permission,10 counsel failed to accurately inform defendant of the elements of the 
accused crime,Il and counsel failed to properly inform defendant of the sentencing 
guidelinesl2-the length of sentence he could serve if convicted at trial. 
Competing policies and competing legal analyses wrestle to reach an 
appropriate resolution in such cases. In State v. Grueber (Grueber), the case 
mentioned above, a jury found the defendant guilty of kidnapping and murder. 
Justice demands punishment, but to what degree? Logic reasons that, if the 
defendant's counsel had been effective, the defendant could have worked out a 
plea bargain with the state. Fairness demands that he be given back that 
opportunity. 
The sense of unfairness intensifies when one recognizes that the defendant's 
deprivation occurred in part because of his poverty, Counsel appointed for indigent 
defendants is far more likely to perform deficiently than counsel hired and paid for 
by the defendant. 13 The Supreme Court has created safeguards for defendants who 
receive the ineffective assistance of counsel. I4 However, the question to be 
addressed is whether these safeguards apply to counsel's assistance at the plea 
bargaining stage when the defendant pleads not guilty, or whether these safeguards 
are reserved to ensure the constitutional right to a fair trial. If these safeguards do 
not apply outside of the right to a fair trial, then wealthy defendants inevitably 
receive far greater advantage over indigent defendants during the plea bargaining 
process because financial resources can ensure effective assistance even where the 
9 E.g., United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994); Rasmussen v. 
State, 658 S.W.2d 867, 867-68 (Ark. 1983); Cottle v. State, 733 So. 2d 963, 964-65 (Fla. 
1999); Lloyd v. State, 373 S.E.2d 1, 2 (Ga. 1988); Lyles v. State, 382 N.E.2d 991, 993 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1978); Williams v. State, 605 A.2d 103, 105 (Md. 1992); State v. Simmons, 
309 S.E.2d 493,496 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); Hanzelka v. State, 682 S.W.2d 385,386 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1984); Becton v. Hun, 516 S.E.2d 762,764 (W. Va. 1999). 
10 E.g., Lyles, 382 N.E. 2d at 993. 
11 E.g., State v. Kraus, 397 N.W.2d 671, 672 (Iowa 1986). 
12 E.g., United States v. Herrera, 412 F.3d 577, 579 (5th Cir. 2005); Magana v. 
Hofbauer, 2001 FED App. 0291P, 263 F.3d 542,545 (6th Cir.); United States v. Gordon, 
156 F.3d 376, 377 (2d Cir. 1998); Engelen v. United States, 68 F.3d 238, 240 (8th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 40 (3d Cir. 1992); People v. Curry, 687 N.E.2d 
877, 883 (111. 1997). 
13 See Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a Wrongful Conviction: Theoretical 
Implications and Practical Solutions, 51 VILL. L. REv. 337, 370-73 (2006) (discussing 
prevalent problems defendants experience with appointed counsel); see also Adele 
Bernhard, Effective Assistance of Counsel, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTNES ON 
FAILED JUSTICE 220, 225-26 (Sandra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2000). 
14 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 774 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(describing the right to effective assistance of counsel as a "safeguard" against 
"'miscarriages of justice'" (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,496 (1986))). 
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law is silent.1s Indigent defendants, therefore, who are more often subject to 
ineffective assistance,16 are more likely to agree to longer sentences during plea 
bargaining or even find themselves assigned stricter sentences after a conviction at 
trial17 when a plea bargain would have been a viable option had counsel provided 
them with adequate representation. 
The discussion section of this Note looks in depth at how the courts determine 
whether the ineffective assistance of counsel safeguards should apply to plea 
bargaining assistance. Broadly, courts have looked to interpretations of the Sixth 
Amendment right to assistance of counsel,18 modem Supreme Court case law, the 
balance of interests in justice and fairness, and other external factors. The majority 
of courts have concluded that the right does apply to all outcomes of the plea 
bargaining stage.19 A minority of courts have concluded that the right does not 
apply to plea bargains when the defendant pleads not guilty.2o To understand these 
positions as well as determine the best approach to the problem, it is necessary to 
understand the history behind the Sixth Amendment, the evolution of the right to 
counsel through Supreme Court precedent, and the evolution of plea bargaining. 
II. BACKGROUND: HISTORY OF THE RIGHT To COUNSEL
 
AND THE EVOLUTION OF PLEA BARGAINING
 
A. History ofand Intent behind the Right to Counsel 
The historical backdrop of the colonists' intentions behind the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel reveals the right originated to protect individual 
15 See, e.g., Bob Sablatura, Study Confirms Money Counts in County's Courts: Those 
Using Appointed Lawyers Are Twice as Likely to Serve Time, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 17, 
1999, at Al (presenting revealing statistics for Harris County, Texas: 43% of defendants 
with hired counsel received probation while only 26% of defendants with appointed 
counsel received probation; 23% of defendants with hired counsel had their cases 
dismissed while only 14% of defendants with appointed counsel had their cases dismissed; 
and most significantly, only 29% of defendants with hired counsel were sentenced to jail or 
prison while 58% of defendants with appointed counsel were sentenced to jail or prison). 
16 Medwed, supra note 13, at 370-73. 
17 Todd R. Falzone, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: A Plea Bargain Lost, 28 
CAL. W. L. REv. 431,431-32 (1992) (explaining that defendants who receive ineffective 
counsel that causes them to plead not guilty likely encounter much stiffer sentences after a 
trial conviction than what they would through a plea bargain); see also Hans Zeisel, The 
Disposition of Felony Arrests, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 407, 444-49 (estimating a 
forty-two percent increase in the severity of sentences offered at trial as opposed to those 
obtained through guilty pleas). 
18 U.S. CaNST. amend. VI. 
19 This includes all federal circuit and most state courts that have decided this issue. 
See infra note 62. 
20 These courts are in Louisiana, Missouri, Tennessee, and Utah. See infra note 63. 
1188 UTAH LAW REVIEW [No.4 
freedom and create a fair playing field between a legally uneducated defendant and 
a legally competent prosecution. 
The early colonists expressed and demonstrated a desire to bring a greater 
focus on the individual in legal proceedings. While the right to legal representation 
arose in England in 1688 after the Revolution,21 the English limited the right to 
felonies of treason until 1836?2 The colonists sought a justice system that was 
governed more by the people than by a few powerful elite. A trend formed in the 
seventeenth century "toward popular, nontechnical administration of justice.,,23 
The right to counsel, public trials, and jury trials arose from this trend.24 In 1676, 
West Jersey documented the following law: "that no person or persons shall be 
compelled to fee any attorney or councilor to plead his cause, but that all persons 
have free liberty to plead his own cause.,,25 Thus, West Jersey established the right 
to a pro se defense. 
In the late seventeenth century, professional lawyers gained recognition in 
colonial society.26 Educated in England, these lawyers brought the English 
modifications enacted after the Revolution of 1688?? Colonists associated the new 
liberties regarding witnesses and counsel with the aims of greater freedom that 
overthrew the Stuarts and Tories.28 Pennsylvania boldly declared, "that all 
Criminals shall have the same Privileges of Witnesses and Council as their 
Prosecutors.,,29 
The Supreme Court recognized that, "[a]fter the Declaration of 
Independence ... rights basic to the making of a defense, entered the new state 
constitutions in wholesale fashion. The right to counsel was clearly thought to 
supplement the primary right of the accused to defend himself.,,30 When contesting 
the adoption of the United States Constitution at the Massachusetts Convention, 
Holmes stated, "The mode of trial is altogether indetermined; whether the criminal 
is to be allowed the benefit of counsel ... [t]hese are matters of by no means small 
21 FRANCIS HOWARD HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 10 (1951) (citing 7 Will. 3, 
c.3 (1695) (Eng.)). 
22 I d. (citing 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114 (Eng.)). 
23 I d. at 17. 
24 I d. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 20 (citing CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR passim 
(1911)). 
27 I d.
 
28 Id.
 
29 PA. CHARTER OF PRNILEGES, art. V (1701); see HELLER, supra note 21, at 20 
(citin~ PA. CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES, art. V (1701)). 
oFaretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 829 (1975). 
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consequence ....,,31 The right to counsel was subsequently included in the Bill of 
Rights as part of the Sixth Amendment. 
Originally, the right to counsel was a right of the accused, not an obligation of 
the govemment.32 However, in 1938 Justice Black writing .for the Supreme Court 
majority stated, "The Sixth Amendment withholds from the federal courts, in all 
criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or 
liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.,,33 Therefore, it became 
necessary for courts to appoint counsel when a defendant was unable to retain 
counsel. Of significance was Justice Black's rationale: "the average defendant does 
not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a 
tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented 
by experienced and learned counsel.,,34 
Thus, the historical backdrop to the modem application of the right to counsel 
indicates that the right exists to protect individual freedom and level the playing 
field between the legally unlearned defendant and the competent prosecution. 
B. Interpreting the Sixth Amendment Ri-ght to the Assistance ofCounsel 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees, "In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed ... and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.,,35 The 
Supreme Court expressly connected the enumerated right to the assistance of 
counsel with the initial clause of the Amendment, "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to ... the Assistance' of Counsel.,,36 Thereby, the 
Court appears to limit the right to counsel by tying it to the right's role in ensuring 
a fair trial.37 
31 HELLER, supra note 21, at 26 (quoting 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS 
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 109-11 
(1835)). 
32 Alexander Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U. 
L.Q. REv. 1, 8 (1944). 
33 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938). 
34 Id. at 462-63. 
35 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
36 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1967); see also Argersinger v. 
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that a person accused of a federal or state crime 
has the right to have counsel appointed if retained counsel cannot be obtained). 
37 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (noting that "the right to the 
effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect 
it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trail"). 
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The Court also explained that inherent in the right to counsel is the principle 
of effectiveness:38 Counsel must assist effectively; otherwise the defendant's right 
to counsel has been violated.39 Furthermore, the right to counsel extends to all 
"critical stages of the proceedings" that affect the tria1.40 Critical stages include 
lineups,41 arraignments,42 and guilty pleas.43 All of these confrontations require the 
effective assistance of counsel to "preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair 
trial.,,44 Thus in light of early definitions of critical stages, the purpose of the right 
to counsel remained the guarantee of a fair trial. The court has since expanded the 
scope of the right, recognizing that certain pretrial proceedings can impact the 
fairness of the later trial. 
In 1984, the Supreme Court not only expanded the scope of critical stages, but 
the Court also established the modern test to determine whether counsel was 
ineffective.45 Previously, only pretrial proceedings were considered critical, based 
on their ability to impact the later trial. Strickland v. Washington (Strickland) 
reasoned that the right to effective assistance extends to capital sentencing 
proceedings because they are "sufficiently like a trial in [their] adversarial format 
and in the existence of standards for decision. ,,46 Thus, Strickland expanded the 
38 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) ("That a person who happens 
to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the 
constitutional command. The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of 
counsel because it envisions counsel is playing a role that is critical to the ability of the 
adversarial system to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an 
attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial 
is fair."); see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) ("It has long been 
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." 
(citing Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85,90 (1955); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 
69-70 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444,446 (1940); and Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45, 57 (1932))). 
39 Powell, 287 U.S. at 53; see also Wade, 388 U.S. at 224-25 (1967). 
40 Wade, 388 U.S. at 224. 
41 Id. at 227-28. 
42 White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 
(1961). 
43 Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475 (1945) (recognizing that "[t]he decision to 
plead guilty is a decision to allow a judgment of conviction to be entered without a 
hearing-a decision which is irrevocable and which forecloses any possibility of 
establishing innocence"). Thus, because a guilty plea forecloses a later trial, counsel is 
necessary to ensure that the result is just; otherwise, the right to a fair trial has been 
violated. 
44 Wade, 388 U.S. at 227. 
45 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984). 
46 Id. However, petitions for writ of habeas corpus do not implicate the right to 
counsel because they do not constitute a criminal prosecution or a critical stage. 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). While not a constitutional right, the right 
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scope of the right to counsel to include proceedings outside the previously 
recognized "critical stages" to proceedings that have (1) an adversarial format, and 
(2) a standard for governing their decisions. 
Strickland also established the modem two-pronged test for ineffective 
assistance: (1) whether counsel performed deficiently; and (2) whether the 
deficiency prejudiced the defendant.47 A defendant must meet both prongs, 
otherwise his claim fails.48 
The first prong, deficient performance, places a very high burden on the 
defendant. The defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was 
unreasonable under "prevailing professional norms,,,49 while the court is obligated 
to "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance.,,5o As the Court stated: "counsel is strongly 
presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions 
in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.,,51 Furthermore, the appellate 
court should not use hindsight to evaluate counsel's performance;52 rather, the 
court should give deference to co.unsel's strategic choices.53 One of the great 
pitfalls for defendants who argue ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal is the 
strategic choice element. If counsel performed a certain way for strategic purposes, 
then the defendant cannot demonstrate ineffective assistance, even when the trial 
outcome demonstrated that the strategy was ineffective.54 
The burden of the second prong, prejudice, is also hard to overcome and it 
brings an additional challenge of ambiguity. To satisfy this prong, the defendant 
must prove that counsel's performance caused an unreliable proceeding.55 The 
Court has used two different standards to determine whether a proceeding was 
unreliable: (1) whether the proceeding would have had a different result if counsel 
had been effective;56 or (2) whether counsel's errors caused a result at trial that 
to counsel in habeas corpus proceedings has been created by statute in some jurisdictions. 
McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849,855 (1994). 
47 466 U.S. at 686-87. 
48 Id. at 700. 
49 Id. at 688. 
50 Id. at 689. 
51 Id. at 690. 
52 Id. at 689. 
53 I d. at 690-91. 
54 E.g., Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 850 (8th eire 2006) (stating that counsel 
had a strategic purpose in failing to object to an improper closing argument, and therefore 
counsel's conduct was reasonably professional). 
55 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ("The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, 
and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome."). In addition, 
"[c]ounsel ... has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a 
reliable adversarial testing process." Id. at 688. 
56 Id. at 694 (''The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
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cannot be relied on as being juSt.57 These standards create ambiguity because there 
is often a spectrum of justice; differing results can meet the broad standard of 
justice.58 This ambiguity has become significant as the lower courts analyze 
whether a defendant has the right to the effective assistance of counsel during the 
plea bargaining stage if the defendant pleads not guilty and then receives a 
subsequent fair trial with a just but different result than what would have come 
from accepting a plea bargain. 
Since Strickland, the Court has moved closer toward recognizing plea 
bargaining as a "critical stage." In Hill v. Lockhart (Hill), the Supreme Court 
expanded the scope of the right to effective assistance to include guilty pleas that 
were ascertained through plea bargaining.59 When applying the Strickland test to 
this situation, the Court asked (1) whether counsel preformed deficiently during the 
plea bargaining stage; and (2) whether the defendant would have "insisted on 
going to trial" absent counsel's errors.60 The first question is a direct application of 
Strickland's first prong. The second question incorporates both the ideas of a 
different outcome (a jury trial rather than a plea) and an unreliable outcome 
(defendant may have pled guilty when he was actually innocent). This modified 
test works to preserve the same constitutional right that the standard Strickland test 
preserves: the right to a fair trial. By recognizing certain "critical stages" as well as 
the implication of a guilty plea, the Court looks to the impact of these stages on the 
defendant's ability to receive a fair trial. 
While Hill decided that guilty pleas implicate the right to effective assistance, 
the Court has not yet determined whether a not-guilty plea under ineffective 
assistance that is followed by a conviction at a fair trial with effective assistance 
can be overturned due to counsel's ineffectiveness at plea bargaining.61 The 
chall~nge that lower courts face when confronted with this issue is that not-guilty 
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome."). 
57 Id. at 686 ("The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process 
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced ajust result."). 
58 Consider, for example, sentencing proceedings. If a defendant receives the strictest 
possible sentence within the guidelines, but argues that he could have received a lighter 
sentence within the same guidelines if counsel had been effective, then the defendant is 
arguing that counsel's performance caused a different result, although the result may still 
be considered just. 
59 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). It is noteworthy that this opinion contradicted earlier 
Supreme Court dicta on the matter: "[a]nd not even now is it suggested that a layman 
cannot plead guilty unless he has the opinion of a lawyer on the questions of law that might 
arise if he did not admit his guilt." Adams v. United States ex reI. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 
277 (1942). 
60 Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 
61 Turner v. Tennessee, 664 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 
1050 (1992). 
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pleas maintain a defendant's right to a trial. A defendant who pleads not guilty has 
not waived his right to a fair trial. Thus, the question remains: Does he have a 
distinct right to a fair plea bargain or at least effective assistance of counsel during 
the plea bargaining stage? In simpler terms: Should a convicted defendant receive 
a lighter sentence than the law prescribes because of a lost chance at something 
better? A competing sense of justice asks: Should not all criminal defendants have 
the assistance of competent counsel to guide them through the adversarial plea­
bargaining process? 
The lower courts are split on the issue. The majority of courts have found that 
a defendant has a right to effective counsel during the plea bargaining process, 
regardless of whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. All federal circuits and most 
states that have decided the issue take this position.62 However, a few state courts 
have held that a defendant is not prejudiced by ineffective counsel at the plea 
bargaining stage if he pleads not guilty and then goes on to be convicted at a fair 
trial because the defendant has not waived any federal constitutional rights. 
Louisiana, Missouri, Tennessee, and Utah constitute this minority position.63 
62 See, e.g., United States v. Herrera, 412 F.3d 577, 580 (5th Cir. 2005); Humphress v. 
United States, 2005 FED App. 0094P, 398 F.3d 855, 858 (6th Cir.); United States v. 
Rashad, 331 F.3d 908,912 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Tse v. United States, 290 F.3d 462,464 (1st 
Cir. 2002); United States v. Brannon, 48 F. App'x 51,53 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Carter, 130 F.3d 1432, 
1442 (10th Cir. 1997); Engelen v. United States, 68 F.3d 238, 241 (8th Cir. 1995); Coulter 
v. Herring, 60 F.3d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 
1466 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 45 (3d Cir. 1992); Johnson v. 
Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 1986); Avery v. State, Nos. A-4414, A-4691, 1993 
WL 13156870, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1993) (mem.); State v. Donald, 10 P.3d 
1193,1200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); Rasmussen v. State, 658 S.W.2d 867,868 (Ark. 1983); 
In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 755 (Cal. 1992); Cottle v. State, 733 So. 2d 963, 967 (Fla. 
1999); Lloyd v. State, 373 S.E.2d 1, 2 (Ga. 1988); People v. Curry, 687 N.E.2d 877, 882 
(Ill. 1997); Lyles v. State, 382 N.E.2d 991, 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Kraus, 397 
N.W.2d 671, 673 (Iowa 1986); Williams v. State, 605 A.2d 103, 108 (Md. 1992); 
Commonwealth v. Mahar, 809 N.E.2d 989, 992 (Mass. 2004); Hodges v. State, 2002-DP­
00337-SCT, <j[<j[ 65-66,912 So. 2d 730,763 (Miss. 2005); Larson v. State, 766 P.2d 261, 
262 (Nev. 1988); State v. Taccetta, 797 A.2d 884, 887 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002); 
State v. Simmons, 309 S.E.2d 493,497 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Hicks, No. CA2002­
080198, 2003 WL 23095414, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003); Commonwealth v. 
Napper, 385 A.2d 521, 524 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Hanzelka v. State, 682 S.W.2d 385, 387 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1984); In re Plante, 762 A.2d 873, 876 (Vt. 2000); State V. James, 739 
P.2d 1161,1166-67 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); Becton V. Hun, 516 S.E.2d 762,767 (W. Va. 
1999); State V. Lentowski, 569 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). 
63 See, e.g., State V. Monroe, 99-1483, pp. 4-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/22/00), 757 So. 2d 
895,898; Bryan V. State, 134 S.W.3d 795,802 (Mo. Ct. App. 2(04); State V. Riley, No. 01­
C-019201CRoo040, 1992 WL 300876, at *4-9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 22, 1992); State V. 
Geary, 707 P.2d 645,646 (Utah 1985). 
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These two theories each rely on different interpretations of the Sixth 
Amendment. Does the Amendment provide for an individual right to counsel, or is 
that right embedded in the right to a fair trial? Furthermore, if counsel is present 
due to the exercise of an established right, does counsel have a duty to be effective 
in all forms of representation? 
c. Growth and Status ofPlea Bargaining 
Beyond analyzing the basic constitutional right to a fair trial, courts have long 
recognized the prevalence of a different form for settling criminal disputes: plea 
bargaining. This relatively modem approach to criminal justice, which the 
colonists did not envision when drafting the Constitution, has taken a firm place in 
our modem system. Now courts are considering whether the plea bargaining 
process itself merits the right to effective assistance of counsel outside the right to 
a fair trial. 
Prior to 1800, the plea-bargaining- process was essentially nonexistent.64 It 
began to appear during the mid-nineteenth century and became institutionalized in 
American criminal jurisprudence in the last third of the nineteenth century.65 It 
gained significance in the 1920s due to the large number of prohibition cases and 
the 1960s with the growth of street crime.66 
Currently, the overwhelming majority of criminal cases in the United States 
are disposed of by guilty pleas rather than trialS.67 In 2002, ninety-five percent of 
state-court felony convictions and ninety-six percent of federal convictions were 
obtained by guilty pleas.68 Some factors contributing to the pervasiveness of plea 
64 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.1(b), at 6-7 (6th ed. 2004) 
(quoting Mark H. Haller, Plea Bargaining: The Nineteenth Century Context, 13 LAW & 
Soc'YREv. 273, 273 (1979». 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. § 21.1(a), at 4 (citing Michael O. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty 
Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 HARV. L. REv. 293, 314 (1975»; Hans Zeisel, The 
Disposition of Felony Arrests, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 407, 409-10; Note, Plea 
Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L. REv. 564, 564 
(1977); see also John W. Keker, The Advent of the 'Vanishing Trial': Why Trials Matter, 
CHAMPION, September/October 2005, at 32, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/ 
championarticles/A0509p32. 
68 Note, Prejudice and Remedies: Establishing a Comprehensive Framework for 
Ineffective Assistance Length-of-Sentence Claims, 119 HARV. L. REv. 2143, 2148 (2006) 
(citing MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULL., No. 206916, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2002, at 1 
(2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/pdf/fssc02.pdf (providing 
information on state statistics); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
No. 205368, COMPENDIUM OF F'EDERALJUSTICE STATISTICS, 2002, at 58 tbl. 4.2 (2004), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs0204.pdf (providing information on 
federal statistics». 
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bargaining include crowded court dockets, pretrial detention practices, the poor 
quality of some public defenders, financial incentives, the languor of some 
prosecutors, a few incompetent judfes, and police and prosecutors who are better 
skilled at finding the guilty party.6 Plea bargaining ,has proven valuable for the 
prosecution because it provides a quick and simple means to dispose of a large 
70quantity of cases. 
The Supreme Court has recognized the value of plea bargaining,7! but 
explained that plea bargaining standing alone does not constitute a constitutional 
right: "in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the 
judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other 
constitutionally protected interest. It is the ensuing guilty plea that implicates the 
Constitution." 72 Therefore, while plea bargaining is prevalent and accepted, the 
practice does not replace the need for a court's final judgment; nor does an accused 
have a constitutional right to a plea bargain.73 If, therefore, as the Supreme Court 
indicates, only the ensuing guilty plea actually implicates the Constitution, then do 
failed bargaining efforts lack constitutional significance? 
III. DISCUSSION: THE RIFT BETWEEN THE MAJORITY AND THE MINORITY RlTLES 
In the modem system of criminal law, the intermingling of plea bargaining 
with the right to effective assistance of counsel has caused a small division across 
the country. The accused clearly has a constitutional right to counsel, and plea 
bargaining is regularly practiced by the prosecution. But the question remains 
unsettled whether the accused has a right to the effective assistance of counsel 
during the plea-bargaining stage. A minority of jurisdictions recognize that the line 
of Supreme Court cases seems to indicate the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel is tied with the right to a fair trial.74 Hcrwever, every federal circuit and 
most states have extended the right to effective assistance of counsel to include the 
plea bargaining stage.75 Both positions agree the proper method of deciding the 
issue is application of the Strickland test. The positions simply disagree on the 
69 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 64, § 21.1(b), at 7 (citing Malcolm Feeley, Perspectives 
on Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 199,200 (1979)). 
70 Id. § 21.1 (c), at 8-9 (citing Arnold Inker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in 
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE 
REpORT: THE COURTS 108 (1967)). 
71 See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,71 (1977); Santobello v. New York, 404 
U.S. 257,260 (1971). 
72 Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984). 
73 Id. ("A plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it 
is a mere executory agreement whi~h, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not 
deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest."). 
74 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
75 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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test's results. This section discusses the rationales and application of Strickland 
that constitute both the majority and minority positions. 
A. Exploring the Majority Position 
When applying the first Strickland prong, deficient performance, the courts in 
the majority take various approaches to reach the same conclusion: (1) the plea 
bargaining stage is a "critical stage" of the proceedings,76 (2) the defined duties of 
defense counsel are the same during trial as would be needed during plea 
bargaining; furthermore, the duties of counsel are the same whether the defendant 
pleads guilty or not guilty during plea bargaining,77 (3) ABA Standards of 
Professional Conduct include conduct during plea bargaining,78 and (4) the lack of 
counsel at this stage undermines the value of the plea-bargaining process.79 It is 
important to explore each of these arguments in tum to understand the depth and 
breadth of the majority analysis. 
1. Plea Bargaining Is a "Critical Stage" 
Some courts in the majority position have concluded that plea bargaining is a 
"critical stage" as defined by United States v. Wade (Wade),80 therefore, the right 
to effective counsel is attached.8! When the Supreme Court decided Wade, the 
Court analyzed the Framers' intent behind the right to counsel and concluded that 
counsel is necessary not only at trial, but at all "critical stages." The Court noted, 
"'the colonists appreciated that if a defendant were forced to stand alone against 
the state, his case was foredoomed. ,,,82 
Therefore, the Framers intended to broaden the role counsel should play in 
assisting her client: 
The Framers of the Bill of Rights envisaged a broader role for 
counsel than under the practice then prevailing in England of merely 
advising his client in "matters of law," and eschewing any responsibility 
for "matters of fact." The constitutions in at least 11 of the 13 States 
expressly or impliedly abolished this distinction.83 
76 See infra Part III.A.1. 
77 See infra Part III.A.2. 
78 See infra Part III.A.3. 
79 See infra Part III.A.4. 
80 388 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1967). 
81 United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992). 
82 Wade, 388 U.S. at 224 (quoting Comment, An Historical Argument for the Right to 
Counsel during Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1033-34 (1964)). 
83 Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-65 (1932)). 
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In analyzing the Framers' intent, the Supreme Court clearly recognized that 
under the modem criminal justice system the need for counsel extends beyond the 
need for trial assistance-a defendant needs counsel at other critical stages to 
ensure a proper defense:84 
When the Bill of Rights was adopted, there were no organized police 
forces as we know them today. The accused confronted the prosecutor 
and the witnesses against him, and the evidence was marshalled, largely 
at the trial itself. In contrast, today's law enforcement machinery 
involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at 
pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the accused's fate 
and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. In recognition of these 
realities of modem criminal prosecution, our cases have construed the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to "critical" stages of the 
proceedings.85 
Therefore, in order to preserve the trial's integrity as a means of establishing 
truth and justice, the Court found that the assistance of counsel is necessary at 
other critical stages that directly impact the trial. 
Courts that have applied the "critical stage" analysis to the plea-bargaining 
process have done so with terse analysis, overlooking the rationale in Wade. 86 
However, these courts may not be incorrect to describe plea bargaining as a critical 
stage. Plea bargaining certainly involves "critical confrontations,,87 between the 
accused and the prosecution. Furthermore, this is a stage in which the defendant 
needs to be able to present a proper defense to engage in an effective bargaining 
process. "The plain wording of [the Sixth Amendment] guarantee thus 
encompasses counsel's assistance whenever necessary to assure a meaningful 
'defence.,,,88 The reasoning in Wade may then, under a certain interpretation, 
support the extension of the right to counsel to include the plea bargaining process. 
2. Counsel's Duties Are the Same Regardless ofDefendant's Plea 
When looking at counsel's duties, other majority courts reason that the 
extension of the right to counsel is reasonable because counsel's duties in the plea 
bargaining stage are no different from her duties at trial.89 Strickland defined 
defense counsel's "overarching duty" as "advocat[ing] the defendant's 
cause ... consult[ing] with the defendant on important decisions and ... keep[ing] 
84 Id. at 224-25.
 
85 Id. at 224 (citations omitted).
 
86 See, e.g., State v. Kraus, 397 N.W.2d 671, 673 (Iowa 1986).
 
87 Wade, 388 U.S. at 224.
 
88 Id. at 225.
 
89 See, e.g., In re Alvemaz, 830 P.2d 747, 753-54 (1992).
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the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the 
prosecution.,,9o A violation of these duties resulting in defendant entering a 
voluntary guilty plea may constitute ineffective assistance of counse1.91 
The duties of defense counsel during plea bargaining are the same whether the 
assistance results in defendant pleading guilty or not guilty.92 Therefore, the rights 
of a defendant regarding that advice should also be the same, regardless of how the 
defendant decides to plea.93 
3. ABA Standards of Professional Conduct Include Conduct during Plea 
Bargaining 
Some majority courts have considered the implication of ABA standards, as 
referenced in Strickland,94 to find a basis for extending the right to effective 
assistance to plea bargaining.95 ABA standards state that "[d]efense counsel should 
conclude a plea agreement only with the consent of the defendant, and should 
ensure that the decision whether to enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is 
ultimately made by the defendant,,96 and "[d]efense counsel should promptly 
communicate and explain to the accused all significant plea proposals made by the 
prosecutor.,,97 These standards clearly indicate that counsel has specific duties in 
the plea-bargaining stage. When duties are prescribed, then the failure to comply 
with those duties can reasonably be described as ineffective assistance. 
4. The Right Is Necessary to Sustain the Integrity ofPlea Bargaining 
Finally, some courts have looked at the integrity of the plea bargaining 
process. By rejecting the right to counsel when a defendant pleads not guilty in the 
plea bargaining stage, a court "would seriously undermine the functioning of the 
plea negotiation process" because the court would create an imbalance between the 
90 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,688 (1984); see also Alvernaz, 830 P.2d at 
754. 
91 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,58-59 (1985). 
92 See United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 380 (2d Cir. 1998) ("By grossly 
underestimating [the defendant's] sentencing exposure . . . [counsel] breached his duty . . . 
to advise his client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge appears desirable." 
(citations omitted)). 
93 See United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992). 
94 466 U.S. at 688 (noting that ABA standards "are guides to determining what is [a] 
reasonable" standard of representation when determining the merits of an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim). 
95 See, e.g., United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1466 (9th Cir. 1994). 
96 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14-3.2(c) (2d. ed. 1986); see also 
Blaylock, 20 F.3d at 1466. 
97 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-6.2(b) (3d ed. 1993). 
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weight of pleading guilty and the weight of going to trial.98 Not only could harms 
resulting from a guilty plea be redressed on appeal, but also counsel's performance 
would likely be more effective in the plea process because such performance 
would be subject to the scrutiny of the Strickland standards for ineffective 
assistance. The decision to go to trial, however, would lack such benefits; the 
decision itself could not be appealed, and the attorney assisting to make the 
decision has little reason to afford reasonable assistance at that stage. 
These four approaches constitute differing attempts to satisfy the first 
Strickland prong-deficient performance. They demonstrate how counsel's 
performance can fall "below an objective standard of reasonableness.,,99 The first 
three approaches (critical stage, consistent duties, and ABA standards) explain that 
there is a standard for counsel's performance at the plea bargaining stage and they 
explain why the defendant is in need of assistance at this stage. The final approach 
(integrity of plea bargaining), demonstrates why the right is necessary to preserve a 
fair criminal justice system. 
The majority position finds that a defendant meets the second prong of the 
Strickland test, prejudice, by showing that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the plea negotiations 
would have been different; i.e., defendant would have pled guilty and forfeited his 
right to a tria1. 1OO Also, defendant must show that he was deprived of the 
opportunity to exchange a guilty plea for a lesser sentence.10l Upon showing these 
two points, the defendant has sufficiently proven prejudice-that the proceeding 
produced a different result. 102 
The rationale behind this position is explained as the majority courts attempt 
to counter the minority argument. The majority position utilizes basically two 
different approaches: (1) the defendant needs adequate information regarding the 
consequences before he can make a sound decision regarding a plea offer, and (2) 
the result of an error during the plea bargaining stage can be significant, regardless 
of how the defendant pleads. 
The majority contends that even though the defendant may have received a 
fair trial, he is still prejudiced by a much longer sentence than the plea offered. 103 
Some courts in the majority position clearly recognize "that a criminal defendant 
has no constitutional right to a plea bargain,,,l04 but they still conclude that "once 
the State engages in plea bargaining, the defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to 
be adequately informed of the consequences before deciding whether to accept or 
98 In re Alvemaz, 830 P.2d 747, 754 (Cal. 1992). 
99 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
100 See Blaylock, 20 F.3d at 1466-67. 
101 United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1992). 
102 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (referencing Strickland's definition 
of prejudice). 
103 Id. 
104 State v. Donald, 10 P.3d 1193, 1200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). 
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reject the offer"I05 because the "alternate decisions-to plead guilty or instead 
proceed to trial-are products of the same attorney-client interaction and involve 
the same professional obligations of counsel.,,106 
Other courts recognize the distinction between a guilty plea and a not-guilty 
plea followed by a fair trial and state that "the validity of a guilty plea is different 
from the validity of the plea process where an accused pleads not guilty."I07 
However, '~the test for ineffective assistance of counsel should be the same" 
because "the result of an error at this critical stage of the proceedings can have as 
serious an effect on the defendant who pleads not guilty as on the defendant who 
pleads guilty."I08 
These explanations satisfy the personal sense of fairness and rightness that the 
lay person searches for when confronted with this issue. But do they actually 
comply with the United States Constitution? Can we reasonably say that the 
following circumstances are the same: (1) a defendant ignorantly pleads guilty 
without exercising his right to a trial and then desires the opportunity to be tried by 
a jury, and (2) a defendant exercises his right to a trial, is found guilty by his peers, 
and then desires a lighter sentence than resulted from his trial because he missed an 
opportunity to effectively plea bargain? 
B. Exploring the Minority Position 
The minority position relies strongly on (1) the connection between the right 
to the assistance of counsel and the right to a fair trial, but the position also looks 
to (2) contract law, (3) the finality principle, and (4) the remedy problems to reason 
that the extension of the right to effective counsel in this context is inappropriate. 
As with the majority analysis, it is important to explore each of these arguments in 
tum to understand the depth and breadth of the minority analysis. 
1. Not-Guilty Pleas Do Not Implicate the Right to a Fair Trial 
Recognizing the Supreme Court's holding in Hill v. Lockhart,109 the minority 
position distinguishes guilty pleas from not-guilty pleas based on their connection 
to a fair trial. While a guilty plea "deprive[s] the defendant of numerous legal 
protections, including the right to a trial, the presumption of innocence, the right to 
confront his accusers, and the right to appeal," a not-guilty plea has no such 
105 I d. 
106 In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 753 (Cal. 1992). 
107 State v. James, 739 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). 
108 I d. 
109 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985) (holding that guilty pleas implicate the 
right to effective assistance of counsel). 
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implications.110 Therefore, a guilty plea merits the right to effective assistance of 
counsel while a not-guilty plea does not. 
Furthermore, this position contends that clearly there is no constitutional right 
to a plea bargain.111 Thus~ the .defendant is not prejudiced by counsel's deficient 
performance because the defendant "preserved all of his constitutional rights 
including his only chance of being found not guilty."112 As one court stated: "The 
error as to potential sentencing ha[s] no effect on the evidence at trial, no bearing 
on [defendant's] guilt or innocence."113 This argument relies strongly on the 
following Strickland language: "the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and 
is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.,,114 In the absence 
of a right to a plea bargain, a not-guilty plea maintains all of the defendant's 
constitutional rights. Therefore, defendant does not need the assistance of counsel 
to preserve his constitutional rights. 
2. Plea Bargains Are Akin to Contracts 
Louisiana compares a plea bargain to a contract. "A party to a contract may 
obtain a vested interest in its enforcement, but a party who has rejected a contract 
has no such vested interest.,,115 Furthermore, the prosecutor is always in a position 
to withdraw his offer, even after the defendant accepts it, providing that a final 
judgment has not been entered.116 Therefore, a defendant should not be able to 
request the COUlt to reinstate an offer that was at the prosecutor's discretion. 
Furthermore, "[w]hatever potential costs, risks, and consequences caused the 
prosecution to tender its plea offer ... the defendant's rejection of that offer has 
caused the prosecution to incur the very costs, risks, and consequences that the 
prosecution hoped to avoid.,,117 It is unbalanced to give the defendant the benefits 
he would have received if he had entered into the contract, but deprive the 
prosecution of the benefits it would have enjoyed had the contract been accepted. 
110 State v. Monroe, 99-1483, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/22/00), 757 So. 2d 895, 898. 
111 Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977); see also Monroe, 99-1483, p. 5 
n.1, 757 So. 2d at 898 n.1; State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913,919 n.7 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985). 
112 Monroe, 99-1483, p. 4,757 So. 2d at 898. 
113 Id.; see also Geary, 707 P.2d at 646-47. 
114 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984); see also Bryan v. State, 134 
S.W.3d 795,802 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). 
115 Monroe, 99-1483, p. 5, 757 So. 2d at 898. 
116 See United States v. Papaleo, 853 F.2d 16, 18-20 (1st Cir. 1988); Commonwealth 
v. Mahar, 809 N.E.2d 989, 1001 (Mass. 2004) (Sosman, J., concurring). 
117 Mahar, 809 N.E.2d at 1001-02. 
1202 UTAH LAW REVIEW [No.4 
3. Finality Demands that Errorless Jury Verdicts Not Be Overturned 
Some minority courts recognize that inherent in the minority position is 
justice's demand for finality: "Every inroad on" the concept of finality undermines 
confidence in the integrity of our procedures; and, by increasing the volume of 
judicial work, inevitably delays and impairs the orderly administration of 
justice."u8 These courts reason that overturning a jury conviction due to 
ineffective assistance during plea bargaining undermines the finality principle. 
The Supreme Court recognized the need for finality in Hill but reasoned that 
the circumstances warranted an exception. The issue of ineffective assistance "is 
only rarely raised by a petition to set aside a guilty plea,,,u9 the Court explained. 
However, the minority position reasons that the circumstances of not-guilty pleas 
are different. A fair trial has produced a reliable final judgment. Stepping in to alter 
that judgment would infringe on the confidence and integrity of our judicial 
proceedings. Unlike guilty pleas that circumvent a trial, not-guilty pleas implicate 
a trial. Therefore, the minority courts look to the standard of review for 
overturning a jury verdict when the defendant claims ineffectiv~ssistance at trial: 
"whether the petitioner was afforded a fair trial.,,120 This standard does not look at 
proceedings prior to the trial that did not directly impact the trial. 
4. The Majority Position Has Failed to Identify an Appropriate Remedy 
The final problem the minority position confronts is identifying an 
appropriate remedy.121 The majority courts that have dealt with this aspect of the 
issue generally take one of two approaches: grant the defendant a new trial122 or 
require the prosecution to reinstate the originally rejected plea offer. 123 Neither 
approach is appropriate, according to the minority. 
The minority position argues that a new trial on its face hardly seems like a 
viable remedy because the defendant has already been convicted at a fair trial. 
What benefit will one more fair trial really have? In reality, "a new trial is granted 
as a not-so-subtle means of pressuring the prosecution into putting the prior deal 
back on the table.,,124 However, evidence may have changed either to the benefit of 
the prosecution or the defense, making one side unwilling to make a plea deal. 
118 United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (quoting United States v. 
Smith, 440 F.2d 521,528-29 (1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
119 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
120 Rasmussen v. State, 658 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ark. 1983) (Adkisson, C.J., dissenting). 
121 See, e.g., Bryan v. State, 134 S.W.3d 795,804 (Mo. Ct. App. 2(04). 
122 See Hanzelka v. State, 682 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. et. App. 1984); State v. 
Ludwig, 369 N.W.2d 722,728 (Wis. 1985). 
123 E.g., Satterlee v. Wolfenbarger, 2006 FED App. 0218P, 453 F.3d 362, 364 (6th 
Cir.). 
124 Commonwealth v. Mahar, 809 N.E.2d 989, 1002 (Mass. 2004) (referencing In re 
Alvemaz, 830 P.2d 747 (Cal. 1992); Lyles v. State, 382 N.E.2d 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978)). 
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Then it appears that the defendant gets a second shot at proving his innocence even 
though a jury at a fair trial has akeady found him guilty. Or a prosecutor, 
acknowledging the previous conviction, may refuse to make another plea offer 
because the prosecutor is" ·confident they can get another conviction. Thus the 
issuance of a new trial has the significant potential of granting no real remedy at 
all. 125 
The second remedy approach is equally unappealing, according to the 
minority. Requiring the prosecution to reinstate the original plea offer conflicts 
with the established balance ~f power between the parties and the court126 and 
"would be inconsistent with the legitimate exercise of the prosecutorial discretion 
involved in the negotiation.,,127 Furthermore, this remedy extracts the court's role 
in rejecting or accepting a plea bargain when the offer is presented to the court by 
the two parties. 128 Thus, an appropriate remedy has not yet been obtained, even if a 
right can be found. 
IV.	 PREDICTIONS: POSSIBILITY OF SUPREME COURT INTERVENTION AND LIKELY 
RESULT 
A. Likelihood ofSupreme Court Intervention 
Certiorari petitions have been filed to the Supreme Court numerous times in 
hopes of reaching a consensus on this issue.129 However, the Court has repeatedly 
declined to review the issue. Recent developments may soon change this trend. 
Previously, the certiorari petitions to the Supreme Court have been from 
prosecutors in opposition to the majority position.13o The Court likely did not give 
these petitions significant attention because the majority position nearly constitutes 
a consensus; the Court likely did not see a need to explore an issue that is nearly 
unanimously resolved without their assistance. However, the Utah Supreme Court, 
which has taken the minority position, has granted certiorari on the case discussed 
125 See Turner v. Tennessee, 664 F. Supp 1113, 1126 (M.D. Tenn. 1987) ("[W]hen 
ineffective assistance of counsel results in the lost chance to accept a favorable plea 
bargain, simply remanding for a new trial is meaningless."). 
126 Mahar, 809 N.E.2d at 1001....()2. 
127 In re Alvemaz, 830 P.2d at 759. 
128 Id. (stating that "the remedy of specific enforcement of the plea offer" is 
inconsistent "with the exercise of the trial court's broad discretion in determining the 
appropriate sentence for a defendant's criminal conduct"). 
129 A partial list of cases denied certiorari includes Hodges v. Mississippi, 126 S. Ct. 
739 (2005); Humphress v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 199 (2005); Arizona v. Donald, 534 
U.S. 825 (2001); McGinnis v. Mask, 534 U.S. 943 (2001); Baker v. Barbo, 528 U.S. 
911 (1999); Carter v. United States, 523 U.S. 1144 (1998); and Hiatt v. Indiana State 
Student Assistance Commission, 513 U.S. 1154 (1995). 
130 See cases cited supra note 129. 
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in the introduction to this Note, State v. Grueber,131 which could eventually 
persuade the United States Supreme Court to'explore and decide this issue. 
At issue in Grueber is whether the defendant was denied effective assistance 
of counsel prior to trial when counsel failed to fully investigate the prosecution's 
position,132 undermining the defense's strategy. The defendant rejected a plea offer 
that he claims he would have accepted had his counsel performed a thorough 
investigation.133 The Utah Court of Appeals easily decided the issue based on Utah 
precedent: Defendants are '''guarantee[d] fair trials, not plea bargains."'134 
Therefore, defendant was not prejudiced.135 
Presuming that the Utah Supreme Court will continue to follow Utah 
precedent, the defendant will have a strong petition to bring to the United States 
Supreme Court. Considering the large majority of courts that have decided this 
issue differently, the United States Supreme Court may be interested to review the 
rationale behind Utah's precedent. 
B. Predicting the Supreme Court's Ruling 
Predicting the Court's ruling is difficult because there is precedential weight 
on both sides of the issue. Supporting the minority position, a recently decided 
Supreme Court case involved the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the context 
of a defendant's right to choose his counsel. 136 The Court held that "[d]eprivation 
is 'complete' when the defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented 
by the lawyer he wants, regardless of the quality of the representation he 
received.,,137 Analyzing the right to counsel, the Court recognized the distinction 
between the right to effective assistance of counsel and the right to choose one's 
counsel. Specifically, the Court reasoned that the right to effective representation is 
131 133 P.3d 437 (Utah 2006). 
132 An interesting sub-issue relates to what constitutes an effective investigation and 
whether pretrial investigation is really a fact to determine the effectiveness of counsel. See 
Bernhard, supra note 13, at 236 (discussing a study in Maricopa County, Arizona, which 
includes Phoenix, that revealed only 55% of public defenders visited the crime scene 
before the final felony trial, only 31 % interviewed all of the prosecution's witnesses, 15% 
admitted to interviewing none of the prosecution's witnesses, and an overwhelming 30% 
entered plea agreements without interviewing any defense witnesses). 
To locate the Arizona study, see Marty Lieberman, Investigation of Facts in 
Preparation for Plea Bargaining, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 557, 576, 579; and Margaret L. 
Steiner, Adequacy of Fact Investigation in Criminal Defense Lawyers' Trial Preparation, 
1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 523, 534--38. 
133 State v. Grueber, 2005 UT App 480U. 
134Id. (quoting State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645,646 (Utah 1985)); see also ide (citing 
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993); and State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 n.7 
(Utah 1987)). 
135 Grueber, 2005 UT App 480U. 
136 See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2561 (2006). 
137 Id. at 2563. 
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derived from the right to a fair trial while the right to choose one's counsel is a 
right independent of the right to a fair trial. 138 Of significance to the issue under 
discussion is the acknowledgement that the Supreme Court continues to view the 
right to effective assistance as a right tied to a fair trial. The majority position had 
disregarded this connection when it analyzed the right to counsel in relation to plea 
bargaining. Therefore, Gonzalez-Lopez seems to favor the minority position. 
However, two distinct approaches remain to justify the extension of the right 
to effective assistance during plea bargaining. The first approach looks at the 
invocation of the right to counsel at a stage prior to plea bargaining. The second 
approach looks at the intention behind the Sixth Amendment to reason that the 
Framers would have preserved such a right had plea bargaining been a colonial 
method of resolving criminal disputes. These approaches can sufficiently address 
the first Strickland prong, but the second, prejudice, must be handled differently. 
The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that "the right to counsel is the right 
to the effective assistance of counsel.,,139 The "Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
is triggered 'at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated ... 
whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or 
arraignment.,,,14o Plea bargaining that takes place after the right to counsel has 
been invoked involves the assistance of counsel, whether or not plea bargaining 
itself invokes the right. Therefore, if counsel is present and assisting, then counsel 
should surely be effective, otherwise counsel may be more of a hindrance than an 
aid. For example, if counsel renders significantly bad advice, misinforms the 
defendant of the sentencing guidelines, or fails to inform defendant of a plea offer, 
the defendant is in a worse position than if he were acting without the counsel's 
assistance. Counsel's "principal responsibility is to serve the undivided interests of 
his client.,,141 As the Court noted, "'defense counsel who is appointed by the court 
... has exactly the same duties and burdens and responsibilities as the highly paid, 
paid-in-advance criminal defense lawyer.",142 Therefore, when a client is 
represented by counsel whose performance falls "below an objective standard of 
reasonableness,,143 then that client has been subjected to ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
The Court can parse the right to counsel from the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel by reasoning that when counsel is representing a client due to 
a right previously invoked, then that counsel has a duty to be effective in her 
complete representation of her client, r~gardless of her client's right to counsel 
regarding a later stage at which counsel must participate because of a previously 
138 Id. 
139 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,771 n.14 (1970). 
140 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 523 (2004) (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 
430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977)). 
141 Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193,204 (1979). 
142 Id. at 200 n.17 (quoting Warren E. Burger, Counsel for the Prosecution and 
Defense-Their Roles under the Minimum Standards, 8 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 2, 6 (1969)). 
143 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
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invoked constitutional right. In other words, if counsel is present, then counsel 
must be effective. 
The second approach, justifying the right to effective counsel at plea 
bargaining, best fits with the original intention behind the Sixth Amendment, to 
ensure the average defendant has the professional legal skills to balance the skill 
and training of the prosecution.144 As the practice of plea bargaining has gained 
prominence, surely the Supreme Court will recognize that effective counsel is 
necessary for a lay defendant in the adversarial process. 
Beyond these rationales, parsing the right to counsel and recognizing the 
Framers' intent, lingers the question of prejudice. The prosecution may argue that a 
defendant cannot be prejudiced when he receives a fair trial and a subsequent fair 
sentence, as guided by law. Furthermore, a defendant's inability to take advantage 
of a windfall regarding sentencing is not sufficient prejudice because he did not 
have a right to less than the law prescribes. In other words, a person who intended 
to enter the lottery and already chose the numbers for his ticket has no remedy 
when he fails to enter, even though his chosen numbers constitute the winning 
ticket. He is certainly deserving of some sympathy; but society would not demand 
that he receive any of the prize money. Likewise, a defendant who is able to make 
a good deal and thereby save the prosecution the time and expense of a trial is 
fortunate because he receives a lighter sentence. However, that lighter sentence is 
not a right nor even a privilege he can claim after the trial is over. 
This approach can be countered in three ways: (1) understanding that "the 
lottery" is being played by both the defendant and the prosecution, (2) considering 
the legal principle of agency, and (3) recognizing that the test for prejudice asks 
whether the result absent counsel's errors would have been different, not whether 
the result would have been fair. 
Plea bargaining is just that, a bargain. Both sides play a game of sorts in 
which they attempt to get the best deal. A prosecutor with a weak case may offer a 
light sentence knowing the odds are slim that he would actually prevail at trial. 
Likewise, a defendant who is afraid of the greater sentence at trial may be willing 
to plead guilty for a lighter sentence. The process only approaches fairness when 
both sides know how to participate. A lay defendant needs the assistance of 
experienced and educated counsel to teach him the rules. Otherwise, he may 
believe the prosecution has a strong case when it does not, or he may miscalculate 
his chances of winning at trial. 
Furthermore, counsel, as defendant's agent, has a duty to advocate for and 
represent the defendant as though she were representing herself. 145 Her failure to 
perform her role as defendant's agent prevents defendant from adequately 
engaging in the overwhelmingly prevalent process of plea bargaining, in which 
144 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
 
145 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
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defendant has an opportunity to receive a sentence much lighter than a judge may 
later give him for the same crime.146 
Of even greater significance is the defined test for prejudice: but for counsel's 
errors the result would have been different. 147 Results based on sentencing, rather 
than guilt or innocence, have constituted such a difference.148 Indeed, the Court has 
found prejudice based on counsel's performance during sentencing-after the 
defendant has been found guilty.149 The circumstances surrounding the issue under 
discussion are analogous. A defendant is not contesting his conviction; rather, he is 
contesting his sentence due to his counsel's failure to adequately represent him 
during the plea-bargaining process. Whether the sentence is determined before a 
plea is entered or after conviction is irrelevant on this matter-the effective 
assistance of counsel is needed at both stages to ensure that the defendant's 
sentence is appropriate. Otherwise, the defendant is prejudiced by an unnecessarily 
longer sentence. 
Therefore, the rationale tends to indicate the Supreme Court will find that a 
defendant is entitled to effective representation when counsel is present; 
furthermore, when counsel's error causes the defendant to receive a longer 
sentence, then the defendant has been prejudiced. 
v. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the event the Supreme Court rules that the right to effective assistance of 
counsel does not extend to the plea bargaining stage, Congress and individual state 
legislatures can and should invest this right in criminal defendants, as has been 
done for post-conviction proceedings. 15o Certainly, the need for equality between 
defendants of varying economic brackets begs action to be taken for indigent 
defendants, who are more likely to receive ineffective assistance during plea 
bargaining. Indigent defendants should receive the same opportunities at a plea 
bargain as wealthier defendants who are more inclined to hire competent counsel 
who will work effectively and vigorously at all stages of the proceedings on their 
client's behalf. 
As a normative matter, a defendant clearly needs the right to effective 
assistance for the plea-bargaining process to be fair. When ninety-five percent of 
felony convictions in state courts result in plea bargaining, 151 leaders and 
administrators should recognize this process needs to be regulated in a way that 
146 STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302, at 40-41, 83 (2005) (noting that judges give 
stricter sentences to defendants who choose to go to trial, a concept known as "trial tax"). 
147 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
148 Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198,203 (2001) ("[Olur jurisprudence suggests 
that any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance."). 
149 Id. at 200, 203-04. 
150 See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(2) (2006). 
151 Note, Prejudice and Remedies, supra note 68, at 2148 (internal citation omitted). 
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preserves our constitutional objective of fairness. 152 Our criminal justice system 
has evolved since the writing of the Constitution;153 the ideals behind the 
constitution need to remain constant in this changing system. Fairness through 
legal competence should exist not only when a case goes to trial, but at all stages 
of interaction between the defendant and the prosecution. Only then can we 
proclaim to protect the rights of the accused. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has found that the Sixth Amendment guarantee to the 
assistance of counsel not only means the effective assistance of counsel during 
trial, but also extends to critical stages of the prosecution that have the potential of 
negating the right to a fair trial. The right to counsel has been found to attach as 
early in the process as the arraignment. However, the right has not been explicitly 
attached to the plea bargaining stage when a defendant rejects a plea bargain, even 
though the defendant's counsel is a participant in the process due to the 
defendant's earlier exercise of his right to council. 
The Supreme Court may soon decide that this right is constitutional. 
However, failure to do so does not negate the possibility of defendants acquiring 
this right by other means. Congress and individual state legislatures can establish 
this right by statute, thereby enabling all defendants the opportunity to be 
effectively represented in the plea bargaining stage, regardless of the defendant's 
inability to hire his own counsel. 
152 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
153 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) ("When the Bill of Rights 
was adopted, there were no organized police forces as we know them today. The accused 
confronted the prosecutor and the witnesses against him, and the evidence was marshalled, 
largely at the trial itself. In contrast, today's law enforcement machinery involves critical 
confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings."). 
AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN PROGENY:
 
TAKING NGUYEN v. INS A STEP BEYOND THE COURT OPINION
 
RAYMINHNGO* 
I. INTRODucTION 
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Nguyen v. INS! that section 
309 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA,,)2 did not violate the equal 
protection guarantee embedded in the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Section 309 governs the acquisition of United States citizenship by a 
child born abroad to unwed parents, one of whom is a United States citizen and the 
other a foreign nationa1.3 However, section 309 imposes different requirements for 
the child's acquisition of her parent's citizenship depending on whether the citizen 
parent is the mother or the father.4 
Under section 309, if the child's United States citizen parent is the mother, the 
child automatically acquires her mother's citizenship at birth, provided at the time 
of the child's birth the mother was a United States national who had been residing 
in the United States for at least one year.5 On the other hand, if the child's United 
States citizen parent is the father, four conditions, above and beyond what are 
required of citizen mothers, must be met. 
First, a blood relationship between the father and the child must be established 
by "clear and convincing evidence.,,6 Second, the father must have been a United 
States national at the time of the child's birth.7 Tlrird, unless he is deceased, the 
father agrees in writing to provide financial support for the child while the child is 
* Senior Staff Member, Utah Law Review. 
1 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
2 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2006). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. § 1409(c). Although "all U.S. citizens are by definition U.S. nationals, not all 
U.S. nationals are U.S. citizens. A U.S. national is defined in the INA as either a U.S. 
citizen or 'a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent 
allegiance to the United States. '" David A. Isaacson, Correcting Anomalies in the United 
States Law oJ Citizenship by Descent, 47 ARIZ. L. REv. 313, 359 (2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(22)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1408. With a few exceptions, United States nationals 
currently "have most of the rights of [U.S.] citizens, and cannot be excluded or deported 
from the United States." Isaacson, supra, at 360. However, the terms are often used 
interchangeably because the statutory distinction between "nationality" and "citizenship" 
"has little practical impact today," and because there are few United States nationals who 
are not also United States citizens. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 467 n.2 (1998) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
6 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1).
 
7Id. § 1409(a)(2).
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under age eighteen.8Finally, one of three things must be satisfied while the child is 
under age eighteen: (1) the child is legitimated under the law of her residence or 
domicile,9 (2) the father acknowledges paternity of the child in writing and under 
oath/o or (3) the child's paternity is established by adjudication of a competent 
11court.
A. The Facts in Nguyen 
Tuan Anh Nguyen ("Nguyen") was born in Saigon,I2 Vietnam, in September 
1969.13 Nguyen's father, Joseph Boulais ("Boulais"), was an American citizen who 
never married Nguyen's mother, a Vietnamese national. I4 Boulais was an ex­
soldier who was working for a military contractor at the time Nguyen was born. I5 
Nguyen's mother abandoned him shortly after her relationship with Boulais ended; 
baby Nguyen then lived with the family of Boulais's new Vietnamese girlfriend. I6 
Nguyen was separated from his father during the fall of Saigon in 1975, and 
he was forced to flee to the United States with his grandmother on a refugee ship.I7 
He was soon after paroled into the United States as a refugee. I8 In Florida, Nguyen, 
who was almost six, was reunited with Boulais, who returned to Texas to raise 
Nguyen. I9 Nguyen thereafter became a permanent resident alien of the United 
States.20 
In 1992, at age twenty-two, Nguyen pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual 
assault on a child, and was sentenced to eight years in prison for each count.21 
Because he was an alien who had committed two "crimes involving moral 
turpitude" on top of an aggravated felony, the Immigration and Naturalization 
8 Id. § 1409(a)(3). 
9 I d. § 1409(a)(4)(A). 
10 I d. § 1409(a)(4)(B). 
11 Id. § 1409(a)(4)(C). 
12 Saigon, the former capitol of South Vietnam, officially became Ho Chi Minh City, 
the current capitol of Vietnam, when North Communist forces defeated and took over 
South Vietnam in 1975. Wendy N. Duong, Gender Equality and Women's Issues in 
Vietnam: The Vietnamese Woman-Warrior and Poet, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL'y J. 191,222 
(2001). 
13 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 57 (2001). 
14 I d. 
15 Brief of Petitioners at 4, Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53 (No. 99-2071), 2000 WL 1706737; 
Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing 
Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 1271, 1280 (2005). 
16 Dowd, supra note 15, at 1280; Isaacson, supra note 5, at 329. 
17 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 15, at 4; Dowd, supra note 15, at 1280. 
18 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 15, at 4; Dowd, supra note 15, at 1280. 
19 Dowd, supra note 15, at 1280. 
20 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57. 
21 Id. 
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Service ("INS,,)22 initiated deportation proceedings against him three years later.23 
Although Boulais had provided financial support for Nguyen throughout Nguyen's 
minority years, he had neglected to establish his paternity prior to Nguyen's 
eighteenth birthday.24 Therefore, under INS regulations, Nguyen was an alien 
eligible for deportation. 
In 1998, while Nguyen's deportation was pending, a Texas state court 
determined Boulais's paternity based on DNA testing, confirming his biological 
relationship with Nguyen.25 Nevertheless, both the Board of Immigration Appeals 
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Nguyen was not entitled to 
citizenship because his father had failed to comply with the requirements of section 
309 in a timely manner.26 The Fifth Circuit also rejected the argument that section 
309 violated equal protection by imposing different requirements on United States 
citizen parents on the basis of their gender.27 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.28 
B. The Holding in Nguyen 
The Supreme Court first acknowledged that the first two requirements of 
section 309(a), subsections (1) and (2), were satisfied.29 The Court also held that 
the third requirement, subsection 309(a)(3), did not apply to Nguyen because it had 
been added in 1986, after his birth?O However, the Court held that the fourth 
requirement, subsection 309(a)(4), was not satisfied.3 ! Nguyen was therefore 
ineligible for citizenship under section 309.32 
22 Shortly after September 11, 2001, jurisdiction over the INS was transferred from 
the Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security; further, the INS was 
divided into three new agencies, one of which was the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Service ("USCIS"), which now has jurisdiction over immigration benefits 
including residency and naturalization applications. See MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION 
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN 
DEFENDANTS 6-7 (2003); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Immigration 
Services and Benefits, http://www.uscis.gov (follow "Services & Benefits" hyperlink) (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2006). For purposes of this discussion, "INS" is used instead of "USCIS." 
23 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57; see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii) (1994 & Supp. IV 
1998). 
24 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 15, at 5. 
25 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57. 
26 [d. at 57-58. 
27 [d. at 58. 
28 Nguyen v. INS, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000). 
29 See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(I)-(2) (2006). 
30 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 60; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(3). 
31 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 60. The Court stated that all parties in the litigation agreed the 
affirmative requirements of subsection 309(a)(4) were not satisfied. [d. 
32 [d. 
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Having determined that Nguyen was ineligible for citizenship, the Court 
considered whether section 309' s gender-based distinction was constitutional. 
Following its equal protection jurisprudence, the Court applied heightened 
scrutiny. Therefore, the question was whether the "classification serve[d] ... 
important governmental objectives [and whether] the discriminatory means 
employed [were] substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.,,33 
The Court held that section 309 satisfied that standard.34 
Although the Court acknowledged that section 309 imposed unequal 
conditions on fathers and mothers, it reasoned that Congress had legitimate reasons 
for the gender-based distinction. Specifically, the Court identified two important 
government objectives behind the distinction?5 The first was the "importance of 
assuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists.,,36 
In the case of the mother, the Court reasoned that a biological parent-child 
relationship is verifiable from birth: the mother is always present at her child's 
birth, and her status is documented, in most instances, by the birth certificate or 
hospital records and witnesses who attest to her having given birth.37 The father, on 
the other hand, need not be present at his child's birth.38 Even if he is present, "that 
circumstance is not incontrovertible proof of fatherhood.,,39 In short, because the 
mother's biological relationship to the child is verifiable at birth whereas the 
father's is not, this justifies imposing additional burdens on the father to establish 
his biological relationship with the child. 
The second important government objective was Congress's desire to: 
[E]nsure that the child and the citizen parent have some demonstrated 
opportunity or potential to develop not just a relationship that is 
recognized, as a formal matter, by the law, but one that consists of the 
real, everyday ties that provide a connection between child and citizen 
parent and, in tum, the United States.40 
Here, the Court reasoned that because the mother is always present at her child's 
birth, it necessarily follows that she will always have an "initial point of contact" 
33 Id. at 60-61 (citations omitted). 
34 Id. at 71. The Court was confronted with a constitutional challenge against section 
309 in Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998). However, as noted in Nguyen, because of 
the highly fragmented nature of that decision the constitutional issue was not resolved. 
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 58. 
35 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62. 
36 I d. 
37 Id. 
38 I d. 
39 Id. (citations omitted). 
4° I d. at 64-65 (citation omitted). 
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with the child.41 Therefore, there is at least an "opportunity" for a meaningful 
parent-child relationship to develop beyond the biological one.42 
However, in the case of the unwed father, because of the nine-month interval 
between conception and birth, it is not certain that he would know "that a child was 
conceived, nor is it always clear that even the mother will be sure of the father's 
identity.,,43 This fact is exacerbated where the child was born abroad and out of 
wedlock. The concern here, said the Court, "has always been with young people, 
men for the most part, who are on duty with the Armed Forces in foreign 
countries.,,44 Without an initial point of contact with the child, there is no guarantee 
the father and the child will have an opportunity to develop a meaningful parent­
child relationship beyond the purely biological one.45 For this reason, Congress 
was justified in imposing on fathers the affirmative requirements of section 309(a). 
Having held that section 309 survived heightened scrutiny and was therefore 
constitutional, the Court applied the statute to the facts of the case. Although 
Boulais had established his biological relationship with Nguyen to a 99.98% 
certainty through a DNA test,46 the Court found the test was insufficient for 
purposes of section 309.47 Specifically, because the affirmative requirements of 
subsection 309(a)(4) were not satisfied in time, Nguyen was not eligible for 
citizenship as a child born out of wedlock to a United States citizen.48 The Court so 
held despite not only DNA evidence of Boulais's biological relationship with 
41 Id. at 66. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 65. 
44 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
45 Id. at 66. 
46 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 15, at 7. 
47 The Court specifically rejected Nguyen's argument that DNA evidence of paternity 
should be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 309 because the sophistication of 
modern DNA tests serves the requirement of subsection 309(1), which requires only "clear 
and convincing evidence" of blood paternity. Nguyen, 533 u.s. at 63 (citations omitted). In 
other words, Nguyen argued that satisfaction of subsection 309(1) should be sufficient for 
purposes of establishing paternity and, therefore, section 309. Id. In rejecting that 
argument, the Court reasoned that the 
Constitution . . . does not require that Congress elect one particular mechanism 
from among many possible methods of establishing paternity, even if that 
mechanism arguably might be the most scientifically advanced method. With 
respect to DNA testing, the expense, reliability, and availability of such testing 
in various parts of the world may have been of particular concern to Congress. 
Id. (citation omitted). Further, the Court reasoned that "[t]he importance of the 
governmental interest at issue here is too profound to be satisfied merely by conducting a 
DNA test ... scientific proof of biological paternity does nothing, by itself, to ensure 
contact between father and child during the child's minority." Id. at 67. 
48 Id. at 60. 
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Nguyen, but also evidence that Boulais had raised Nguyen in the United States 
since Nguyen was six and that Nguyen's mother had long abandoned him.49 
Ultimately, the Court's holding could be described as one that was driven by legal 
technicalities rather than reality.50 
C. A Step beyond the Court Opinion 
What is troubling about Nguyen, aside from the fact that the Court paid only 
lip service to the "heightened scrutiny" it purported to apply, is that the Court 
analyzed the issue and pronounced its holding primarily within the framework of 
gender discrimination or equal protection.51 Hence, much of the legal scholarship 
commenting on this case has, following the Court's lead, analyzed Nguyen in terms 
of its implications on gender equality, the rights of fathers, or equal protection 
generally. In other words, scholarship has largely focused on the impact of Nguyen 
on citizen parents.52 However, this strictly citizen-parent-centered approach 
ignores the class of persons most affected by the decision: non-citizen children. In 
49 Dowd, supra note 15, at 1280; Isaacson, supra note 5, at 329. 
50 "Reality" here refers not only to the reality that Nguyen had a meaningful parent­
child relationship with his father (which was clearly stronger than the almost nonexistent 
relationship he shared with his mother) beyond his biological ties, but also to the reality 
that a mother's presence at her child's birth does not necessarily result in a meaningful 
parent-child relationship consisting of "everyday ties" between mother and child. As 
Justice O'Connor argued in her dissenting opinion, joined by three other justices, even 
though it may be a biological truism that a mother will always be present at her child's 
birth, a mother 
may not have an opportunity for a [meaningful] relationship [with the child] if 
the child is removed from his or her mother on account of alleged abuse or 
neglect, or if the child and mother are separated by tragedy, such as disaster or 
war, of the sort apparently present in this case. 
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 86-87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
51 This approach, of course, was largely influenced by the way the parties to the 
litigation framed the issue. See generally Brief of Petitioners, Brief of Respondents, and 
Amicus Briefs in Support of Petitioners, Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53 (No. 99-2071), 2000 WL 
1706737. For purposes of the litigation, equal protection and gender discrimination 
probably afforded the most promising challenge the petitioners could make. 
52 For an excellent discussion of Nguyen from the perspective of the parents (gender 
equality, the rights of fathers, or equal protection), see generally Kif Augustine-Adams, 
Gendered States: A Comparative Construction of Citizenship and Nation, 41 VA. J. INT'L 
L. 93 (2000); Dowd, supra note 15; and Jacqueline Barrett, Note, Nguyen v. INS: Are Sex­
Based Classifications in Citizenship Laws Really Constitutional?, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMPo 
LJ. 391 (2002). See also Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74-97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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Nguyen and other immigration cases,53 it is the children who are denied 
citizenship, or even worse, deported. 
Perhaps a more troubling aspect of the Court's opinion is that it seemingly 
overlooked the social and historical backdrop from which the litigation sprang. 
Missing from the opinion is the significant fact that Nguyen was part of a class of 
mixed-race children-Amerasians-who were not only connected to the United 
States through the intimate channel of their American fathers' blood, but who had 
also been placed in their position through accident of birth and through the 
combined action of parents, government, and society. Amerasians can generally be 
described as children who have been involuntarily born of war, shunned by the 
people and societies that brought about their existence, and trapped between two 
national and cultural identities while belonging to neither. 
Relatively little legal scholarship has been devoted to the history and plight of 
Amerasians over the years, even though the United States government has 
statutorily recognized their existence to address, albeit inadequately, the myriad 
problems they have faced. This Note is aimed at shedding more light onto this 
class of largely forgotten children who, in the opinion of the author, should 
rightfully be considered not only children but also citizens of America, for 
humanitarian as well as jurisprudential reasons. At the same time, this Note places 
Nguyen in a larger social and historical context than that which appears on the 
textual face of the Court's opinion, and as a result focuses the analysis more on the 
children and less on the parents.54 
Part II of this Note provides a more detailed history of Amerasians, including 
the legal steps the United States has taken in addressing the dire circumstances in 
which these children have found themselves over the last few decades. Part III 
provides a broad overview of Congress's plenary power in the area of immigration, 
followed by a discussion of citizenship and deportation, particularly how they 
affect Amerasians, such as Nguyen, in serious ways. Part N makes 
recommendations to Congress on how it can improve the lives of Amerasians and 
other similarly situated classes of children. 
53 See, e.g., Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissing 
Barthelemy's petition for review of order of removal because his parents were never 
married). 
54 This discussion, therefore, does not deal exclusively with Nguyen or section 309, 
but with the larger context of Amerasian history and legislation, and their struggle for 
identity and survival. Of cour:se, Nguyen and section 309 each occupies an important role 
in, and acts as a springboard for, this discussion of that larger context. 
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II. AMERASIANS: HISTORY, LEGISLATION,
 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR IDENTITY AND SURVIVAL
 
A. Children ofthe Dust 
Since World War II, the United States military has encouraged sexual 
relations between United States servicemen and East Asian women abroad.55 
Because of harsh conditions faced by soldiers stationed overseas, especially at 
times of war, these young men "frequently felt the need to find solace in women 
and liquor."56 The United States military, in tum, felt the need to placate, if not 
reward, its soldiers for their military efforts, and to "preserve the soldiers' 
morale.,,57 
During the Vietnam War, for instance, the- military encouraged this behavior 
"as a way to escape from the rigors of jungle warfare.,,58 In what they called "Rest 
and Recreation" ("R&R"),59 single servicemen were sent to "exotic" cities where 
they were given access to local wotnen-prostitutes.6o Although the United States 
and the international community had· by then denounced prostitution as harmful, 
and had enacted policies in an attempt to control it,61 military commanders 
nevertheless helped establish military brothels in cities like Danan where they did 
everything from regulating the price of prostitution to checking the health of 
prostitutes for sexually transmitted diseases, usually with the help of the local 
55 Robin S. Levi, Note, Legacies of War: The United States' Obligation toward 
Amerasians, 29 STAN. J. INT'LL. 459,459-60 (1993). See generally Gwyn Kirk & Carolyn 
Bowen Francis, Redefining Security: Women Challenge U.S. Military Policy and Practice 
in East Asia, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 239-48 (2000) (noting the negative social 
effects of United States military presence on host communities in East Asia, including 
military prostitution, the abuse of local women, and the dire situation of mixed-race 
children fathered by United States servicemen). 
56 Levi, supra note 55, at 466. 
57 Id. at 467~ see also CYNTHIA ENLOE, THE MORNING AFfER: SEXUAL POLITICS AT 
THE END OF THE COLD WAR 142-60, 183 (1993) (noting that in Central America, Vietnam, 
the Philippines, South Korea, Puerto Rico, Germany, Italy, and even the mainland United 
States, the Pentagon has operated as if prostitution were a necessary and integral part of 
United States military operations)~ Emily Nyen Chang, Note, Engagement Abroad: 
Enlisted Men, U.S. Military Policy and the Sex Industry, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL'y 621, 625 (2001) ("Military brothels grew from the desire to keep the enlisted 
men happy, analogizing sex to movies, laundry service, and other necessary luxury items." 
(citation omitted)). 
58 Levi, supra note 55, at 466. 
59 Chang, supra note 57, at 621. 
60 See Kirk & Francis, supra note 55, at 241 (noting that in South Korea, Japan, and 
the Philippines, prostitution was officially forbidden but practiced under such euphemisms 
as the "hospitality industry" or simply "entertainment")~ Levi, supra note 55, at 467. 
61 Chang, supra note 57, at 621. 
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government.62 This practice led to the births of tens of thousands of mixed-race 
children known as "Amerasians," not only in Vietnam but also in South Korea, the 
Philippines, and other East Asian countries that have had a large United States 
military presence.63 
Amerasians born in Vietnam were often fatherless because their American 
fathers had either died on the battlefields or left after completing their tours of 
duty, sometimes unaware of or indifferent to whether they had fathered an 
Amerasian child.64 Even the soldiers who wanted to bring their children back to the 
United States often faced tremendous difficulties. While the military encouraged 
recreational sex among its soldiers, it disapproved of long-term relations between 
the soldiers and Vietnamese women.65 As a result, once the soldiers completed 
their tours of duty in Vietnam,66 it was incredibly difficult for them to get past the 
bureaucratic hurdles and bring their Vietnamese children, wives, or girlfriends 
back to the United States.67 A few tried but to no avail.68 
Because of this, thousands of Amerasians were left to suffer poverty, 
abandonment, homelessness, malnutrition, official and unofficial discrimination, 
harassment, sexual abuse, torture, and general resentment in their native country. 
Amerasians were treated poorly by their government as well as their own people, 
including those closest to them. This stemmed from the fact that these children 
were the visual representations of "U.S. military intervention in Asia.,,69 
Accordingly, they were given degrading labels such as bui doi (literally meaning 
"dust of life") in Vietnam, indicating "the sentiment that [they were] lower than the 
dirt one walks on.,,70 In the Philippines they were "throw-away" children, and in 
South Korea they were "half breed.,,71 
62 Id. at 628, 633; Kirk & Francis, supra note 55, at 241-45; Levi, supra note 55, at 
467. 
63 Levi, supra note 55, at 460; see also Kirk & Francis, supra note 55, at 259 (noting 
that since the United States occupation of various Asian countries beginning in 1898, 
United States servicemen have fathered between an estimated 30,000 and 50,000 
Amerasian children). 
64 Levi, supra note 55, at 468; see also ROBERT S. MCKELVEY, THE DUST OF LIFE: 
AMERICA'S CHILDREN ABANDONED IN VIETNAM 102 (1999) (noting that while some 
Americans took responsibility for their children, most did not, leaving many Amerasians 
and their mothers to fend for themselves). 
65 Levi, supra note 55, at 467. 
66 The military's policy in South Korea and the Philippines, including its co-operation 
of brothels and its prohibition of long-term relations between United States servicemen and 
local women, was similar to that which existed in Vietnam. Id. at 468-69. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 467-68. 
69 Id. at 460. 
7° Id. 
71 Id. 
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Vietnamese Amerasians, the largest documented group of Amerasians,72 were 
denied educational and employment opportunities because they were considered 
"collaborators" or "children" of the enemy.73 Many were abandoned not only by 
their American fathers but also by their Vietnamese mothers and subsequent 
caretakers, who were ashamed of the child's mixed race,74 could not afford to care 
for the child, or simply could not handle the discrimination they suffered for' 
having the child.75 In school, Amerasians were taunted, assaulted, and generally 
looked down upon by their teachers as well as their classmates. Many dropped out 
of school as a result.76 
Further, their mothers were labeled traitors and whores for prostituting and 
mingling with the enemy.77 Little did anyone, including the American soldiers 
stationed there, seem to know or care that many of these women were "prostitutes 
by necessity, by circumstances, and by all of the destruction of war.,,78 Many had 
to prostitute to put food on the table, and others were sold into prostitution by their 
families.79 In addition, many of their Amerasian children may have been a product 
of rape rather than consensual sex with the soldiers.80 
Nevertheless, because Vietnam was largely a homogeneous society where 
pure blood was valued over mixed blood, and a patriarchal society where standing 
in society depended on one's husband or father, without a father figure it was very 
72 Id. But see Joseph M. Ahern, Comment, Out of Sight, Out ofMind: United States 
Immigration Law and Policy as Applied to Filipino-Amerasians, 1 PAC. RIM L. & POL'y J. 
105, 120 (1992) ("[M]ore Amerasians have been born in the Philippines than in all other 
Asian countries combined, including Vietnam." (footnote omitted)). 
73 MCKELVEY, supra note 64, at 3, 36; see also Levi, supra note 55, at 469, 471. 
74 Stephen L. Bennett, Comment, The Vietnamese Shrimpers of Texas: Salvaging a 
Sinking Industry, 6 SCHOLAR 287, 303 (2004) (noting that many in Vietnam viewed an 
Amerasian's mixed blood as a symbol of "disunity and a dissolution of the national 
blood"). 
75 See McKELVEY, supra note 64, at 3,36; Levi, supra note 55, at 472; Mary Eileen 
English, Resettling Vietnamese Amerasians: What Have We Learned?, at 57 (2001) (Ed.D. 
dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst), available at http://scholarworks.umass. 
edu/dissertations/AAI3027195/ (follow "Download the dissertation" hyperlink to order the 
publication in PDP format) . 
76 Levi, supra note 55, at 472. 
77 See ide at 470-72. 
78 English, supra note 75, at 58 (quoting Lucy Nguyen, a caseworker with Lutheran 
Child and Family Services); see also TRIN YARBOROUGH, SURVIVING TWICE, AMERASIAN 
CHILDREN OF THE VIETNAM WAR 16-20 (2005) (detailing the events giving rise to and 
surrounding the prostitution industry in Vietnam during the war); Chang, supra note 57, at 
638-39 (noting that the U.S. military bases were often situated "in already economically 
depressed countries," and many of these women had to choose "between extreme poverty 
and prostitution"). 
79 See English, supra note 75, at 60. 
80 Id.; see also infra note 204 and accompanying text. 
1219 2006] AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN PROGENY 
difficult for an Amerasian to function in the society.81 Consequently, many ended 
up in orphanages or on the streets of Ho Chi Minh City as gang members or 
prostitutes.82 Others were forced to live in the harsh, isolated conditions of 
communist Vietnam's "New Economic Zones.,,83 
Amerasians throughout Asia faced similar difficulties. In South Korea, 
Amerasians suffered similar levels of "poverty, discrimination, and solitude.,,84 
They were "taunted for their American-looking features and . . . branded as 
children of imperialists and prostitutes."s5 In the Philippines, many Amerasians 
were born into poverty near the military bases and, as a result, ended up in the bar 
system that had facilitated their birth.86 Many Filipino Amerasians were also sold 
or abandoned by their mothers and, like Amerasians elsewhere, were resented 
because they were reminders of United States intervention.87 
Because of their unbearable situation, Amerasians often negatively projected 
their frustrations onto others and society, (through criminal activity) or onto 
themselves.88 With respect to the latter, it was not infrequent for young 
Amerasians, males in particular, to mutilate themselves if they had not committed 
81 STEVEN DEBONIS, CHILDREN OF THE ENEMY: ORAL HISTORIES OF VIETNAMESE 
AMERASIANS AND THEIR MOTHERS 6 (1995); Levi, supra note 55, at 469-70. For a while, 
the Vietnamese government even considered Amerasians as United States nationals, not 
only out of contempt for Amerasians but also because, in Vietnam, one's citizenship 
stemmed from the father. Id.; see also 131 CONG. REc. 5, 5978 (1985) (statement of Rep. 
Smith) ("Amerasian children are currently the object of either official or unofficial 
discrimination in the countries where they now reside . . . . Since the Amerasian child has 
been abandoned by his or her American father, the opportunities for social acceptance, a 
good education, job, and marriage are almost nonexistent."); Diane H. Yoon, The American 
Response to Amerasian Identity and Rights, 7 BERKELEY MCNAIR REs. J. 71, 72-73 
(1999), available at http://www-mcnair.berkeley.edul99McNairJournal/yoon/yoon.pdf 
(noting that in Korea, as in many East Asian countries, a person's birth and death are 
recorded and kept in her hometown; however, if the child was born out of wedlock, 
especially to a foreign soldier who has since disappeared, the mother is not able to register 
the child; lacking legal documentation of her existence, the child is basically stateless and 
therefore cannot attend school); MaryKim DeMonaco, Note, Disorderly Departure: An 
Analysis of the United States Policy toward Amerasian Immigration, 15 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 
641, 648 (1989) (noting that in Vietnam, fathers customarily claimed legal paternity, 
registered their child's birth, and took care of their child's school enrollment). 
82 Levi, supra note 55, at 472. 
83 MCKELVEY, supra note 64, at 9. New Economic Zones ("NEZs") were previously 
unsettled or sparsely settled regions of Vietnam to which former South Vietnamese military 
and officials, their families, Amerasians, and others were sent as settlers to expand 
Vietnam's cultivatable land and reduce urban crowding. Id. at 124. 
84 Levi, supra note 55, at 473-74. 
85 Id. at 473. 
86 Id. at 474-75. 
87 Id. at 475. 
88 See Yoon, supra note 81, at 74-75. 
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suicide.89 For instance, Steven DeBonis, while collecting oral histories of 
Amerasians at the Philippines Refugee Processing Center ("PRPC"), made the 
following observations on a young Vietnamese Amerasian male: 
I caught a glimpse of him as he came in out of the weather and entered 
the billet next door, wearing only gym shorts and flip-flops. Self-inflicted 
bums and slash marks are common among Amerasians, but never had I 
seen them to this extent. The young man's torso, arms, and legs had been 
terribly mutilated. Raised lines of scar tissue overlay his body, one slash 
criss-crossing into the next. Tattooed ladies danced across his belly .... 
. . . Like many in the PRPC, he has left family behind. He worries 
about his wife and child in Vietnam; foremost in his thoughts is how to 
bring them to America once he arrives there. When he mentions them, 
his eyes swell with tears.90 
B. Coming to America 
Soon after its withdrawal, the United States government began reassessing its 
policies in Vietnam, specifically with respect to the thousands of children who 
came to be known as "Amerasians" and whom many in the United States learned 
had been fathered by American soldiers but abandoned in that country during the 
war.
91 Realizing the plight of these children back in Vietnam, legislators felt that 
the United States had a moral obligation to bring these children to America to 
reunite them with their American fathers if possible.92 One congressman even 
described the Amerasian problem as "a national embarrassment" for the United 
States.93 
The first major United States legislation that specifically addressed the 
Amerasian problem was a set of amendments to the INA in 1982 known as the 
Amerasian Immigration Act.94 These amendments placed Amerasians from 
89 Id. ("Bombarded from childhood with comments and actions that point to their ... 
difference, many Amerasians display extremely negative conceptions about themselves."). 
90 DEBONIS, supra note 81, at 98-99. 
91 See Ranjana Natarajan, Amerasians and Gender-Based Equal Protection under 
U.S. Citizenship Law, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 123, 125-26 (1998). 
92 See ide 
93 Amerasian Citizenship Initiative, Vietnamese Amerasians in America, http://www. 
amerasianusa.org/ (select the "Issue Overview" hyperlink from the left-most pane) (quoting 
Senator Stewart B. McKinney) (internal quotation marks omitted) (last visited Nov. 1, 
2006). 
94 Act of Oct. 22, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-359, 96 Stat. 1716 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1154 (2006)). Prior to the 1982 amendments, Amerasians were admitted through a 
United Nations-sponsored program known as the "Orderly Departure Program"; however, 
because of the over-inclusive nature of that program it did not effectively address the 
Amerasian problem. See DeMonaco, supra note 81, at 643. 
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Vietnam, Korea, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand in the highest preference category 
for immigration.95 An Amerasian wishing to immigrate to the United States under 
the 1982 amendments had to petition the Attorney General for an immigrant visa, 
providing proof that she was fathered by a United States citizen and was born 
between 1950 and 1982.96 Her physical appearance, along with documentary proof 
if any, was considered in deciding whether to issue her a visa.97 
Because of strict provisions, the lack of diplomatic ties between the United 
States and Vietnam, the exclusion of Amerasians in other East Asian countries, and 
other various problems, the 1982 amendments were largely unsuccessful in helping 
Amerasians as a class.98 A subsequent effort by President Ronald Reagan, known 
as the 1984 Amerasian Initiative, was also unsuccessful in that regard. President 
Reagan's initiative specifically permitted Vietnamese Amerasians to immigrate to 
the United States along with their families, whereas the 1982 amendments only 
allowed an Amerasian to immigrate to the United States alone and therefore 
leaving any loved ones behind.99 Unfortunately, strained relations between the 
United States and Vietnam prevented the initiative from realizing its full 
potential. 100 
Meanwhile, through the media the American public became increasingly 
aware of and emotionally invested in the existence and plight of its Amerasian 
children in Vietnam.10l At the public's behest, Congress revisited the Amerasian 
problem in 1987.102 That year, Congress passed the Indochinese Refugee 
Resettlement and Protection Act, popularly known as the Amerasian Homecoming 
Act. 103 The Homecoming Act provided that all Amerasians born in Vietnam 
between January 1, 1962, and January 1, 1976, could immigrate to the United 
States along with their immediate family, guardians, or a spouse. 104 The Act also 
exempted Amerasians from immigration quotas and, to appease the Vietnamese 
95 Levi, supra note 55, at 485-86. 
96 Id. at 486. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.; see also English, supra note 75, at 17 (noting that the 1982 Act "had no 
enforceability in the cases of thousands of Amerasians in Vietnam" because of a lack of 
diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam). 
99 Levi, supra note 55, at 486-87. 
100 Id. at 487. 
101 YARBOROUGH, supra note 78, at 101. In 1987, the Long Island Newsday carried a 
photograph showing a blond-haired, blue-eyed, fourteen-year-old Amerasian boy who had 
been crippled by polio as a child and was now earning a living by dragging himself on his 
hands and knees through the streets of Vietnam, begging. Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Indochinese Refugee Resettlement and Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100­
202, 101 Stat. 1329. 
104 Id. 
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government, did not classify Amerasians as "refugees,,105 even though they were 
eligible for full refugee benefits.106 
Under the Act, United States officials interviewed Amerasians in Ho Chi 
Minh City.107 If an Amerasian received permission to immigrate to the United 
States, the Amerasian and her family were first sent to a refugee camp in the 
Philippines for six months of English lessons and "cultural orientation.,,108 After 
they completed that training, the immigrants were sent to the United States. Once 
they arrived in the United States, they were taken to one of many cluster sites 
located~ throughout the country, where community volunteer agencies helped them 
with school or vocational training and helped them take advantage of social 
services.109 
Although the Act was more comprehensive than its predecessors in 
addressing the Amerasian problem, there were still shortcomings. For example, in 
the aforementioned interviews, parentage was established if possible through 
documentary evidence such as birth certificates, letters, and photographs.110 
Unfortunately, because most families destroyed records of their Amerasian child's 
birth out of embarrassment or fear of reprisal by their government,111 interviewers 
had to rely mostly on their instincts; where documents had been destroyed, the 
Amerasians "face [was her] passport.,,112 
In addition to establishing the Amerasian's parentage, interviewers tried to 
determine whether family members who wanted to accompany the Amerasian to 
the United States had bona fide, familial-like ties with the Amerasian. 113 
Frequently, many Amerasians sold themselves, or were sold by their families, to 
others who merely wanted a ticket to the United States by pretending to be a 
family member of the Amerasian.114 Once the Amerasian and her "family" reached 
105 The United States government originally intended to classify Amerasians as 
"refugees" under the Act, which would have exempted them from annual immigration 
quotas; however, the Vietnamese government insisted that Amerasians were not refugees at 
all but were children and citizens of America, and they were therefore the responsibility of 
America. The United States government resolved this conflict by not labeling Amerasians 
as "refugees" but still granting them the same benefits granted to refugees, and using the 
resettlement process that was "normally used for refugees." YARBOROUGH, supra note 78, 
at 103. 
106 Levi, supra note 55, at 489-90. 
107 Id. at 490. 
108 Id. Prejudice against Amerasians persisted at these refugee camps, which handled 
the resettlement of (in addition to Amerasians and their accompanying "relatives") former 
political prisoners, boat refugees, and those who were being sponsored by Vietnamese 
relatives already residing in the United States. YARBOROUGH, supra note 78, at 126. 
109 Levi, supra note 55, at 490. 
110 Id. 
111 MCKELVEY, supra note 64, at 47. 
112 Levi, supra note 55, at 490. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
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the United States, the Amerasian' was, not infrequently, either abandoned or subject 
to further scorn and discrimination within her home and community. 115 
Because the interview in Vietnam was the last stage where the United States 
government could "prevent family members operating under false pretenses or 
those who [were] not even truly family members from benefiting from the 
Homecoming Act,,,116 interviewers were at times overly cautious in issuing visas. 
This resulted in the arbitrary decline of many Amerasian applications and their 
family merrlbers who were otherwise eligible for a visa under the Act. A typical 
rejection letter, often unsigned, informed the rejected Amerasian: 
On the basis of the information provided by you . . . and on the basis of 
the results of a personal interview of you by the consular officer, it has 
been determined that you do not meet the requirements for consideration 
of an Amerasian visa. Specifically, you do not have the physical 
appearance that is characteristic of Amerasians, you do not possess 
documentation that would support a claim of Amerasian status, and you 
are not able to provide a personal account that would support a finding of 
Amerasian status . . . . We regret that this decision could not have been 
favorable. 117 
c. Life in America and Now 
Amerasians118 who arrived in the United States continued to face many of the 
same difficulties they faced in their native country. First, as noted above, deeply 
ingrained prejudice within the Vietnamese community against mixed-race children 
persisted in America. Also, because many survived on the streets as criminals or 
prostitutes in Vietnam, they had little formal education and familial support before 
coming to the United States.119 Consequently, they were "at a higher risk for 
problems such as drug use, crime, and suicide than previous Indochinese 
immigrants."120 They were subject to constant feelings of alienation and 
depression. 121 lliiteracy in both the Vietnamese and English languages, coupled 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 491. 
117 YARBOROUGH, supra note 78, at 229 (internal quotation marks omitted). This was 
an actual form letter from the u.s. consulate in Vietnam, dated May 1999, to an Amerasian 
man rejecting his application for an Amerasian visa. Id. 
118 Although this discussion focuses mainly on Vietnamese Amerasians, the 
experience of Vietnamese Amerasians (in their native country and then in the United 
States) is fairly representative of the experience of Amerasians from other countries. Levi, 
supra note 55, at 493. However, except where noted otherwise, the term "Amerasian(s)" as 
used throughout the remainder of this discussion refers to those from Vietnam. 
119 Id. 
12° Id. 
121 Id. at 496. 
1224 UTAH LAW REVIEW [No.4 
with their inability to cope with the American school environment, contributed to a 
high dropout rate. 122 
In addition, Amerasians suffered from another problem in the United States, 
perhaps most detrimental of all: the inability to reunite with their long-lost 
American fathers. For many, especially those who had been abandoned by their 
mothers and rejected by their society, reuniting with their American fathers 
became their last hope for a life worth living.123 Unfortunately, very few 
Amerasians had "identifying information about their fathers" aside from "names 
and hometowns.,,124 Privacy laws and government inactivity also hampered the 
ability of many Amerasians to locate their fathers, and vice versa.125 
Even when an Amerasian successfully reunites with her father, he may reject 
her "or the reunion[] otherwise fail[s] to work OUt.,,126 Undoubtedly, either of these 
situations is a devastating blow for the Amerasian. Her Asian mother has rejected 
her. The people in her native country have long rejected and resented her. Her 
American father has now rejected her as well. Without adequate exposure, 
education, and assimilation into her fatherland, and without a community network 
committed to guiding and supporting her, she does not have what it takes to 
function in the complexities of modem-day America. 
Despite the aforementioned legislation, the United States government has 
never treated its Amerasian children as full citizens, but as aliens-outsiders-who 
are only eligible for citizenship upon affirmative action undertaken either by their 
fathers (through section 309) or by themselves (through naturalization). 127 Rejected 
by her father and not fully welcomed in America, the Amerasian in the above 
scenario may be inclined to return to the country where she grew up, but because 
discrimination against Amerasians continues in her native country and she lacks 
the legal and financial means to return, this is neither an enticing nor a realistic 
option. Stranded in the United States, she now finds herself in the dilemma of 
having been born-through no fault of her own-as a war child of two societies, 
122 [d. at 495-96. 
123 See, e.g., YARBOROUGH, supra note 78, at 247 (explaining the guilt the author felt 
when an Amerasian male took his own life shortly after she had told him he was never 
going to find his American father). 
124 Levi, supra note 55, at 494. 
125 [d.; see also THOMAS BASS, VIElNAMERICA: THE WAR COMES HOME 189-90 
(1996) (noting that the Department of Defense had a policy of withholding the names of its 
military personnel, which prevented thousands of Amerasians living in America from 
reuniting with their fathers); YARBOROUGH, supra note 78, at 122 (noting that the United 
States government's policy to "protect the privacy" of its American fathers "prevented 
access to simple records that would have helped thousands more Amerasians locate their 
dads"). 
126 Levi, supra note 55, at 495 (citations omitted); see also MCKELVEY, supra note 
64, at 102 ("A very few [Amerasians]-perhaps two or three percent-actually locate their 
American fathers and reunite with them. Such reunions are often not successful."). 
127 See infra Part III.B. 
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but belonging to neither. 128 She ultimately lacks a national and cultural identity as 
well as a place to call home.129 At the least, she now realizes why, on the other side 
of the globe, they call her and others like her "children of the dust." 
A famous quotation attributed to William Gladstone from over a century ago 
instructs that "justice delayed is justice denied.,,130 The Vietnamese Amerasians 
were denied justice from the day of their conception when the United States 
military encouraged its soldiers to have recreational sex with local Vietnamese 
women, but discouraged those soldiers from taking responsibility for the resultant 
offspring. 13 ! To compound the problem, the United States government delayed 
taking serious responsibility for its blond-haired, blue-eyed Amerasian children 
from the time when the last United States troops withdrew from that country in 
1975 to the passage of the Homecoming Act twelve years later in 1987. 
The Homecoming Act has brought thousands of Amerasian children to the 
United States who would otherwise have continued to live in poverty on the streets 
of Vietnam, committing crimes or prostituting while hoping for the day when their 
American fathers would return to take them away to a better place. The Act has 
brought in an estimated 30,000 Amerasians, accompanied by another 80,000 of 
their "relatives," since its passage.132 The Act has also provided an improved 
environment for these children as they settle in the United States and has helped 
them acquire some of the skills and education necessary to achieve assimilation in 
American society. 
However, despite its successes, the Act has yet to eliminate all of the 
problems experienced by Amerasians. Although the statistics are uncertain, it is 
estimated that thousands of Amerasians remain scattered throughout various parts 
of Vietnam, typically in rural or remote regions of the country. 133 Also, because the 
128 See DeMonaco, supra note 81, at 641 ("The progeny of the ultimate meeting of 
East and West-the Amerasians-belong to neither society; they are not considered Asians 
nor are they accepted as Americans."). 
129 See Yoon, supra note 81, at 72 (arguing that United States immigration policy, 
namely its unwillingness to grant an Amerasian automatic citizenship, neglects to address 
the primary source of an Amerasian's "hardship-their inability to establish a legitimate 
national identity"). For a broader perspective on the Amerasian identity crisis, see Shandon 
Phan, Vietnamese Amerasians in America (2003), Asian-Nation: The Landscape of Asian 
America, http://www.asian-nation.org/amerasians.shtml. 
130 Peter Sessions, Note, Swift Justice?: Imposing a Statute of Limitations on the 
Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions of State Prisoners, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1513, 1568 
(1997). 
131 See supra notes 55--68 and accompanying text. 
132 YARBOROUGH, supra note 78, at 123; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
VIETNAMESE AMERASIAN RESEITLEMENT EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND FAMILY 
OUTCOMES IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1994), 1994 WL 810587, available at 
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat4/151037.pdf (noting that as of March 1994, approximately 
75,000 Vietnamese Amerasians and their families had resettled in the United States under 
the Homecoming Act). 
133 Id. at 224. 
1226 UTAH LAW REVIEW [No.4 
Act was written exclusively for Vietnamese Amerasians, Amerasians from other 
countries such as South Korea and the Philippines have benefited little, if at all, 
from the Act, even though their situations are equally as bad as those from 
Vietnam. Estimates of non-Vietnamese Amerasians living around the world 
number in the tens of thousands.134 
For Amerasians who were fortunate enough to come to the United States, the 
cycle of abandonment, poverty, illiteracy, and crime that was destined for them 
since birth continues to hamper their ability to be accepted and productive 
members of American society.135 Unspoken racism and discrimination against 
Amerasians persist in pocket Vietnamese communities throughout the United 
States, where most Amerasians reside,136 thus preventing them from living happy 
and fulfilling lives. An inability to reunite with their American fathers also instills 
in them a sense of doom, helplessness, hopelessness, and a lack of self identity. 137 
Also, as alluded to above, the United States government has not yet granted 
automatic citizenship to its Amerasian children, even though these children are 
genetically connected to the United States through the seeds their American fathers 
planted and despite the fact that the United States has implicitly acknowledged its 
responsibility for these children by resettling them in the United States and 
providing them full refugee-type benefits. In 2003, a bill was proposed in the 108th 
Congress that, if passed, would have granted automatic citizenship to Amerasians 
who had already resettled in the United States under the Homecoming Act. 138 
However, this bill was defeated. 139 Without citizenship status, Amerasians are 
treated like any other class of aliens and, as a result, they are deprived of the full 
134 Kirk & Francis, supra note 55, at 259. 
135 See Amerasian Citizenship Initiative, http://www.amerasianusa.org/ (follow "Issue 
overview" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 30, 2006) ("[L]ife in America is still a daily struggle 
against poverty and all kinds of problems: mental health, social isolation, discrimination, 
language barrier[s], lack of job opportunities, violence. Due to their lack of education and 
survival skills, most of them can only find low-paying, entry-level jobs and live in poor, 
poverty-stricken neighborhoods. And many continue to show symptoms of psychological 
disorders."). 
136 Id. (noting that Vietnamese Amerasians who are residing in the United States 
today "concentrate in metropolitan areas, usually around the Vietnamese community"). 
137 See Cynthia R. Mabry, Who Is the Baby's Daddy (And Why Is It Importantfor the 
Child to Know)?, 34 U. BALT. L. REv. 211, 212 (2004) (noting that a child's identity is 
developed through interaction with her father and that a child has a better chance of 
"complete psychological development" when a responsible male role model is involved in 
the child's life); English, supra note 75, at 34 ("In Vietnam, a person's identity comes from 
one's relationship with one's family, especially the father."). 
138 Amerasian Naturalization Act of 2003, H.R. 3360, 108th Congo (2003). 
139 Another bill was introduced in 2005 by Representative Zoe Lofgren of California 
that, like the 2003 bill, would provide automatic citizenship for certain Amerasians; the bill 
is currently pending in the House with seemingly little support. Amerasian Naturalization 
Act, H.R. 2687, 109th Congo (2005). 
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range of rights and privileges available only to citizens.14o As Nguyen illustrates, 
this can sometimes have devastating consequences for the Amerasian. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLE: PLENARY POWER, CITIZENSHIP, AND
 
DEPORTATION
 
A. The Plenary Power Doctrine 
No discussion pertaining to United States immigration law is adequate 
without a discussion of what is generally known as the "plenary power doctrine," 
which played a pivotal role in the Court's decision in Nguyen141 and will continue 
to play a pivotal role in the Court's treatment of other aliens, including 
Amerasians. This section provides a broad overview of the plenary power doctrine 
as it relates to United States immigration law. The next two sections discuss two 
specific areas of immigration law: citizenship and deportation, including the 
negative effects they can have on Amerasians, individually and as a class. 
Citizenship and deportation are chosen for discussion here because they are the 
two areas of immigration law that can "make or break" an Amerasian. 
Under the plenary power doctrine, the federal government-specifically, 
Congress-exercises broad powers over the nation's immigration policies. The 
Supreme Court has consistently held onto the view that "immigration and 
naturalization policies pertain exclusively to the political branches of the 
government.,,142 The Court has thus given the federal political branches (Congress 
and the executive departments, such as the INS, that theoretically enforce 
Congress's will) a great amount of deference in immigration-related matters. 143 
For the same reason, the Court has subjected the immigration-related 
decisions of the federal political branches to very minimal review. 144 The Court has 
stated that the "'power to expel or exclude aliens [is] a fundamental sovereign 
attribute exercised by the Government's political departments [which is] largely 
140 See Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation and Justice: A Constitutional Dialogue, 41 
B.C. L. REv. 771, 777 (2000) ("[N]oncitizens are required to register with INS, and to be 
very careful about how long they remain outside the [United States] .... They are not 
allowed to vote, they are ineligible for certain social safety net protections and ineligible 
for certain jobs. Their ability to bring family members here is much more limited than that 
of citizens." (citations omitted». 
141 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 72-73 (2001) ("[W]e need not assess the 
implications of statements in our earlier cases regarding the deference afforded to Congress 
in the exercise of its immigration and naturalization power." (citations omitted)). 
142 RUTH RUBIO-MARIN, IMMIGRATION AS A DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE: CITIZENSHIP 
AND INCLUSION IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 137 (2000). 
143 [d. 
144 [d. 
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immune from judicial control",,145 and "'over no conceivable subject is the 
legislative power of Congress more complete than [over immigration matters].,,,146 
To illustrate this further, the Court has used the plenary power doctrine to uphold 
Congress's exclusion and deportation of aliens on grounds ranging from race and 
national origin to sexual orientation and political affiliation.147 In addition, the 
Court has used the plenary power doctrine to insulate Congress's policies 
governing "aliens' access to welfare and social benefits," as well as their 
participation in various aspects of the political process.148 
Even though courts and legal scholars have generally described Congress's 
plenary power over immigration as something that is inherent in the concept of 
national sovereignty,149 the plenary power doctrine has nevertheless been traced to 
various provisions in the United States Constitution. Although the Constitution 
does not contain any specific language giving either Congress or the executive 
branch the power to control the entry of foreigners, the Constitution does contain 
145 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex reI. Mezei, 
345 U.S. 206,210 (1953)). 
146 Id. at 137-38 (alterations in original) (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. 
Stranhan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)); see ide at 139 n.17 (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, 130 U.S. 581, 603, 604, 606 (1889) ("[T]he power to exclude aliens is an 'incident 
of every independent nation' because if a nation could not control its borders 'it would be 
to that extent subject to the control of another power .... To preserve its independence, 
and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment is the highest duty of every 
nation ...."')); see also Matthew v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82 (1976) (stating that deference to 
the political branches mandates "a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the 
Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization"). 
147 RUBIo-MARIN, supra note 142, at 139 (citing Fon Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
U.S. 698, 713-14 (1893) (upholding an act of Congress authorizing the deportation of 
Chinese laborers under the Chinese Exclusion laws)); see also Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 
118, 120--22 (1967) (holding that the then-existing "psychopathic personality" ground of 
exclusion encompassed homosexuals); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591 
(1952) (upholding a statute that provided for the deportation of legal resident aliens 
because of past membership in the Communist Party). 
148 RUBIo-MARIN, supra note 142, at 133-34, 138. Rubio-Marin also notes that: 
[U]nder the common label of immigration matters the Supreme Court has not 
substantially distinguished between the claims of aliens to enter the country and 
to remain in it once they had settled. Aliens are aliens no matter how long they 
have lived in the country. No distinction has been made to accommodate those 
aliens who have made the USA their main societal habitat. 
Id.; see also Natarajan, supra note 91, at 140 ("Over the past century, the plenary power 
doctrine has been invoked to limit judicial review of immigration laws' even where 
constitutional claims are asserted."). 
149 See, e.g., KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE "HUDDLED MASSES" MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND 
CIVIL RIGHTS 4 (2004) ("[T]he courts have emphasized the plenary power of Congress, 
based on notions of national sovereignty."); RUBIO-MARIN, supra note 142, at 137. 
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language giving Congress the authority to regulate foreign commerce and to adopt 
a uniform rule of naturalization.150 By 1875, the Court had already decided that 
Congress has almost complete control over immigration.151 Congress's 
immigration policies, therefore, preempt not only the immigration policies of the 
other branches of the federal government, but also the immigration policies of the 
states. 
B. Citizenship 
There are three ways a person can acquire United States citizenship under the 
immigration law: birthplace citizenship, citizenship by descent, and citizenship 
through naturalization. First, a person who is born within the United States or one 
of its outlying territories automatically acquires United States citizenship at birth, 
regardless of her parents' citizenship status.152 This process is known as jus soli 
citizenship and is the fastest and perhaps most common way of acquiring United 
States citizenship. Jus soli citizenship is embedded in the express language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, commanding that "[a]ll persons born ... in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.,,153 
The second way a person can acquire United States citizenship is by descent. 
That is, if one or both of her parents are United States citizens, and if certain 
conditions are met, she will be deemed a United States citizen regardless of the 
place of her birth.154 This process is known as jus sanguinis citizenship, and is 
governed primarily by sections 301(c), 301(g), 309(a), and 309(c) of the INA. 155 
Unlike jus soli citizenship, jus sanguinis citizenship is not grounded in any express 
language of the Constitution. For this reason, jus sanguinis does not necessarily 
take effect upon a person's birth, as illu.strated in Nguyen. 
Finally, a person can acquire United States citizenship through the 
naturalization process. Unlike the first two, naturalization does not depend on a 
person's place of birth or her blood ties to a United States national. 156 
Naturalization allows a person who has continuously resided in the United States 
(lawfully) for a specified number of years, and who has satisfied certain additional 
150 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
151 Henderson v. City of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875) (holding a state restriction on 
immigration unconstitutional in violation of foreign commerce clause). 
152 See, e.g., Isaacson, supra note 5, at 316. This means that even children of 
undocumented immigrants acquire automatic, jus soli citizenship if they are born within the 
United States or one of its outlying territories. 
153 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2006). 
154 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) & (g); 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)-(c). 
155 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) 
(codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557); Isaacson, supra note 5, at 317. 
156 See 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (requiring a basic knowledge of the English language, U.S. 
history, and U.S. government); 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (requiring a limited period of continued 
residence in the U.S.). 
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requirements listed in the INA,157 to become a United States cItIzen. In other 
words, naturalization allows those who are not otherwise "natural-born" United 
States citizens to become United States citizens and, consequently, reap the 
benefits that go along with being a United States citizen. 
Naturalization is especially beneficial if not imperative for those who have 
lived in the United States for many years, have established strong ties with the 
United States, and have basically considered themselves a part of the American 
national political community. Many who naturalize may have lived in the United 
States for most of their lives, may have lost most or all of their native culture and 
language, and may have even had children born in the United States. Being a 
naturalized citizen affords them a higher sense of belonging and security, 
especially because it lets them take part in all national elections,158 the results of 
which undoubtedly affect their lives, and hold most public offices.159 Being a 
naturalized citizen also protects them from being easily deported for what may 
seem like inadvertent or otherwise minor criminal offenses.16o 
Jus soli is obviously not available for most Amerasians because, as seen 
above, a vast majority of Amerasians were born abroad; indeed, Amerasians are 
almost by definition born abroad. Naturalization, on the other hand, is not a very 
enticing or realistic option for Amerasians either, as it requires "an extended" 
period of continued residence in the United States in addition to a basic 
understanding of United States history and government; it also requires a basic 
grasp of the English language. 161 As noted above, many Amerasians stopped going 
to school at a very young age and have an almost nonexistent understanding of 
English. 162 For most Amerasians, therefore, jus sanguinis is the most appropriate 
157 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
158 See U.S. CaNST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to 
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude."). 
159 See RUBIo-MARIN, supra note 142, at 133-34 (noting that, although aliens are 
denied the right "to run for office at least in national and state elections," naturalized 
citizens may serve as senators and representatives of the United States). 
160 See JOHNSON, supra note 149, at 118 (noting that under the current immigration 
law, seemingly minor crimes such as possession of a controlled substance, driving under 
the influence of alcohol, and even shoplifting can lead to deportation). 
161 See supra note 156 (citing the United States Code English-language and residence 
requirements for naturalization). 
162 See Bennett, supra note 74, at 303-05 ("Many [Amerasians] are illiterate resulting 
in their inability to pass the written U.S. citizenship exam.... Now in their 30s, most 
illiterate Amerasians have lost hope that they will ever acquire the ability to read or write. 
Since the passage of the Amerasian Homecoming Act of 1987, more than 60 percent have 
yet to acquire U.S. citizenship. In contrast, according to a report by the Urban Institute, 
'nearly half of the nation's legal immigrants had become citizens by 2002.'" (citations 
omitted)); English, supra note 75, at 51 (noting that a high percentage of Vietnamese 
Amerasians are illiterate in both Vietnamese and English). 
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method of acquiring United States citizenship. Nguyen apparently tried to petition 
for jus sanguinis citizenship, specifically through section 309 of the INA. 
Notwithstanding section 309' s differential treatment of the genders, its 
requirements are not terribly difficult to satisfy. To reiterate, the American father 
of a foreign-born, out-of-wedlock child merely has to prove: first, he was a United 
States national at the time the child was born163 (the same requirement imposed on 
citizen mothers); second, he has a blood relationship with the child by "clear and 
convincing evidence"l64 (DNA testing would probably suffice); and third, he has 
agreed in writing that he will provide financial support for the child while the child 
is under eighteen165 (not a daunting task). 
In addition to these three requirements, a fourth requirement must be satisfied 
in one of three ways while the child is under age eighteen: the child's legitimacy is 
established under the law of the child's residence or domicile; the father 
acknowledges paternity in writing under oath; or the father's paternity is 
established by adjudication of a competent court.166 Despite the affirmative nature 
of this fourth requirement, it seems fairly easy to satisfy and section 309 provides a 
grace period of eighteen years starting from the date the child is born for it to be 
satisfied.167 
Nevertheless, as lenient as it may seem textually, in practice section 309 acts 
as a serious obstacle for many Amerasians in their path towards citizenship. For 
one, by requiring fathers to take affirmative action before their Amerasian child 
turns eighteen, section 309 essentially expects fathers to know its specific 
requirements hidden deep within the large body of law that is the United States 
immigration code.168 Although it may be that "ignorance of the law is no excuse," 
this is still a rather irrational or simply unfair statutory scheme, considering that the 
same affirmative action is not required of mothers and that the first three 
requirements of section 309(a) (those imfosed on fathers) collectively achieve the 
same purpose as its fourth requirement. 16 
Also, because of their unique situation as a class, many Amerasians may 
never have the chance to locate, let alone reunite, with their American fathers. For 
many, their American fathers may have died on the battlefields years ago. 170 
Where an Amerasian does reunite with her father, she may be very close to or may 
163 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(2). 
164 Id. § 1409(a)(I). 
165 Id. § 1409(a)(3). 
166 Id. § 1409(a)(4). 
167 Id. 
168 See Isaacson, supra note 5, at 331-36. 
169 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 84-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
170 See, e.g., Michael Benge, The Living Hell ofAmerasians, FRONTPAGE MAG., Nov. 
22, 2005, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=20254 (detailing the 
tragic life of Tuan Phuoc Le, an Amerasian whose father "died fighting for the freedom of 
the Vietnamese"). 
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have already reached eighteen at the time of the reunion, thereby permanently 
barring her from acquiring her father's citizenship under section 309. 
The Court in Nguyen casually dismissed this tragic reality by reasoning that: 
The statute can be satisfied on the day of birth, or the next day, or the 
next 18 years. In this case, the unfortunate, even tragic, circumstance is 
that Boulais did not pursue, or perhaps did not know of, these simple 
steps and alternatives. Any omission, however, does not nullify the 
statutory scheme. 171 
The Court then attempted to alleviate this tragic reality by reasoning that: 
[section 309] is not the sole means by 'which the child of a citizen father 
can attain citizenship. An individual who fails to comply with [section 
309], but who has substantial ties to the United States, can seek 
citizenship in his or her own right, rather than via reliance on ties to a 
citizen parent. 172 
The Court was, in essence, saying that if the father cannot give citizenship to his 
child, the child can-by naturalizing, that is. 
However, as seen above, for most Amerasians, naturalization is not a realistic 
option given the educational, psychological, and language barriers facing them. An 
Amerasian's acquisition of citizenship, in most instances, depends almost entirely 
on her father's knowledge of section 309 and his affirmative action in satisfying its 
requirements. Potentially, the Amerasian suffers at the whim of her father's 
ignorance or irresponsibility. Although Nguyen had the advantage of having been 
raised by his father since he was six years old (and his father, therefore, had plenty 
of time to satisfy section 309), Nguyen's situation is more the exception rather than 
the rule for Amerasians. 
C. Deportation 
Just as Congress has a broad amount of discretion in deciding to whom the 
government will grant United States citizenship, Congress has a broad amount of 
discretion in deciding whom to deport from the country. Deportation is perhaps the 
most drastic punishment under immigration law. Indeed, deportation could be 
ranked among the law's harshest punishments, comparable to life imprisonment, 
termination of parental rights, or capital punishment. As the Supreme Court once 
acknowledged, "deportation may result in the loss 'of all that makes life worth 
living.'''173 Unfortunately, the courts in this country treat deportation proceedings 
171 533 U.S. at 71.
 
172 Id. (citations omitted).
 
173 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (citation omitted).
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as civil rather than criminal; therefore, deportation is not considered a 
"punishment" under immigration law however harsh it may seem. 174 
Prior to 1996, deportation proceedings consisted of two basic steps.175 In the 
first step, the immigration judge determined whether a person was deportable, and 
this was based on whether a person's criminal conduct fell within one of the 
enumerated grounds for deportation listed in the INA.176 If a person was deemed 
deportable, the immigration judge then determined whether the person should be 
deported, and this was done by taking into account the facts and circumstances in 
the particular case.177 
The second step in the pre-1996 proceedings basically provided the 
immigration judge the opportunity to do an equitable, individualized assessment of 
the case before him. The immigration judge was permitted to take into account 
such things as the severity of the crime, the alien's ability for rehabilitation, the 
alien's ties to the United States versus her ties to her country of origin (or to 
wherever she was going to be deported), and the extent to which deportation may 
affect any family she may have in the United States.178 If "the balance of equities 
counseled against deportation," the immigration judge could grant the alien relief 
from deportation. 179 
Unfortunately, in response to the growth in the number of criminal aliens 
incarcerated in the nation's prisons180 and the general desire to get tough on crime, 
Congress passed two major pieces of legislation in 1996: the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)181 and the lliegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).182 These laws drastically amended the 
174 Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts 
about Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1889, 1894-95 (2000) (citing 
Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) ("While the 
consequences of deportation may assuredly be grave, they are not imposed as a 
punishment.")); see also Kanstroom, supra note 140, at 784 ("Congress want[s] to maintain 
credibility and legitimacy . . . . This is not an intent to punish, just to maintain respect for 
the rule-of-Iaw."). 
175 Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and 
the Limited Scope ofProposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1936, 1938-39 (2000). 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 1939. 
180Id. at 1944. However, Morawetz notes the rise in the number of criminal aliens in 
the nation's prisons was also due to the overall rise in incarceration; between 1972 and 
1997, national incarceration rates increased fivefold. Id. 
181 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 42 U.S.C.), available 
at http://www.uscis.govflpB inflpext.dIVinserts/publaw/publaw-8774?f=templates&fn=docu 
ment-frame.htm#publaw-pl104132. 
182 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 U.S.C.), 
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existing body of immigration law with regard to the consequences of criminal 
convictions for aliens. 183 Among other things, the laws made deportation 
mandatory in large classes of cases. 184 This has, in tum, largely increased the 
number of aliens who are deportable under what was the first step of the pre-1996 
proceedings. 185 The 1996 laws also virtually eliminated the second step of the pre­
1996 proceedings-the individualized assessment. 186 
In Nguyen's case, had he had the advantage of the pre-1996 proceedings, in 
particular the second step, his chances of being deported would have probably 
been much lower considering his individual circumstances. He had lived in the 
United States for almost all of his life, and was raised by his American father in 
Texas since age SiX. 187 He had hardly known his Vietnamese mother as she had 
long abandoned him, and there was no evidence indicating that he ever returned to 
Vietnam. 188 There was also no evidence indicating that Nguyen had any living 
relatives in Vietnam.189 Suffice it to say, Nguyen had substantially more ties to the 
United States than he had with Vietnam.190 
In addition, Nguyen's immutable and visually obvious mixed race probably 
would have been, in the pre-1996 proceedings, a factor for the immigration judge 
to consider in deciding whether to deport him back to Vietnam. As discussed 
above, post-war communist Vietnam, with its anti-American sentiment coupled 
with its traditional, Confucian-inspired emphasis on pure blood and paternity, was 
not particularly kind to mixed-race children like Nguyen. Although conditions 
appear to have improved somewhat over the years, given that Vietnam is still a 
highly homogeneous, class-driven society, and one with a history of human rights 
abuses,191 there is reason to believe that prejudice and discrimination against 
Amerasians are still present. 
available at http://www.uscis.gov/lpBin/lpext.dIVinserts/publaw/publaw-ll124?f=temp 
lates&fn=document-frame.htm#publaw-pll 04208. 
183 Morawetz, supra note 175, at 1936; see also JOHNSON, supra note 149, at 110 ("In 
1996, Congress passed immigration reforms that not only expanded in unprecedented ways 
the scope of crimes that can lead to removal of long-term immigrants from the country but 
also sought to limit, if not completely foreclose, judicial review of removal orders of aliens 
convicted of certain crimes."). 
184 Morawetz, supra note 175, at 1936. 
185 Id. at 1936, 1939. 
186 I d. at 1939. 
187 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 15, at 4. 
188 See ide at 4-5. 
189 See id.; Brief of Respondents, supra note 51, at 5-7. 
190 See Assimilation & Ethnic Identity (2006), Asian-Nation: The Landscape of Asian 
America, http://www.asian-nation.org/assimilation.shtml ("Sociological research has also 
found that the strength of the child's relationship with his/her parents, along with the level 
of his/her attachment to the ethnic community ... play[s an] important role[ ] in 
determining ethnic identity among second generation Asian Americans."). 
191 Benge, supra note 170. 
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By virtually denying immigration judges the opportunity to make an 
equitable, individualized assessment of the facts and circumstances in the 
particular case, the current immigration law harms not only the alien herself but 
also any family she may have in the United States. As one author states, the current 
law deprives immigration judges "the opportunity to take family integrity into 
consideration.,,192 In the past, family members of an alien who was subject to 
deportation had the advantage of "relief hearings" where they had the opportunity 
to testify about the effects deportation (Le., separation from the alien) would have 
on them. 193 However, the current law eliminates such hearings in most instances. 194 
This, in tum, "operate[s] as a statement that the effects of deportation on family 
members does not matter.,,195 
The current immigration system is especially troubling considering that the 
majority of immigration visas issued each year is based on family relationships, 
precisely because immigration law, like family law, favors keeping families 
(husband and wife, parent and child, and siblings) together. 196 However, by 
broadening the classes of deportable crimes, implementing tougher criminal justice 
policies, requiring mandatory sentencing pending appeal, and applying vigorous 
INS enforcement, among other thin~s, the current immigration law betrays its 
traditional emphasis on family unity.1 7 This betrayal, done in the name of tougher 
criminal law enforcement and border control, seriously harms Amerasians and 
their families. 
Nguyen's situation is particularly ironic if not poignant. Unlike thousands of 
other Amerasian children, he had the fortune of leaving post-war communist 
Vietnam and reuniting with his American father, something Congress clearly had 
intended when it passed the Homecoming ACt. 198 Years later, after Nguyen had 
grown up to become an "American," the United States government decided to take 
him away from his father and send him back to Vietnam where he, as an 
Amerasian, would undoubtedly suffer. This, of course, in no way suggests Nguyen 
should be excused for the crimes he committed that led to his deportation. 
However, a "balance of equities" may indicate that deportation was too harsh a 
penalty. 
Certainly for a hypothetical Amerasian in Nguyen's situation who had 
committed a less serious deportable offense, such as a simple assault done in the 
course of shoplifting, deportation would be unjust. On the other hand, suppose an 
individual were convicted of the same crimes for which Nguyen was convicted. 
192 Morawetz, supra note 175, at 1952. 
193 Id. at 1950. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id.; see also Natarajan, supra note 91, at 136 ("Differential treatment of marital 
and non-marital foreign-born children in citizenship law [is] also based on legal 
preferences for marital families over other familial arrangements." (citation omitted». 
197 Morawetz, supra note 175, at 1950. 
198 See supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text. 
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Suppose further this individual were Nguyen's age, originally from Zimbabwe, and 
committed those crimes after naturalization, but had only lived in the United States 
for a total of six years. In this case, immigration law would not mandate 
deportation solely because of his citizenship, despite the fact that his overall ties to 
the United States (residentially, biologically, culturally, and linguistically) are not 
nearly as substantial as Nguyen's. Unfortunately, because of a mere legal 
technicality-his father's failure to establish paternity in a timely manner-the 
immigration court had no option for Nguyen (a "criminal alien") except 
deportation. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
America's involvement in the Vietnam War may have ended, and the war 
itself may be over, but the Amerasian problem is far from being a thing of the past. 
The United States continues to operate military bases in various parts of East Asia. 
As of 2000, there were as many as 37,000 United States troops stationed in ninety­
five United States military bases in South Koreal99 and another 63,000 United 
States military personnel stationed in Japan.2OO An agreement between the United 
States and the Philippines in late 1999 also grants the United States military access 
to various ports in the Philippines.20l 
United States military presence in these and other East Asian countries creates 
various problems for the local people, particularly women and children.202Through 
rigorous training and gender socialization, the military overemphasizes the values 
of "heroism, physical strength, emotional detachment, the capacity for violence 
and killing, and an appearance of invulnerability" among its soldiers.203 By doing 
this, the military instills into the mentality of these young men the idea that they 
need to be assertive and controlling, and women are mere sex objects used for 
reinforcing their masculinity and satisfying their transient sexual needs.204 
199 Kirk & Francis, supra note 55, at 232. 
200 Id. at 234. 
201 Id. at 238-39. 
202 Id. at 239. 
203 Id. at 240-41. 
204 Id. Susan Brownmiller has written: 
It has been argued that when killing is viewed as not only permissible but heroic 
behavior sanctioned by one's government or cause, the distinction between 
taking a human life and other forms of impermissible violence gets lost, and 
rape becomes an unfortunate but inevitable by-product of the necessary game 
called war. . .. The very maleness of the military, the brute power of the 
weaponry exclusive to their hands, spiritual bonding of men at arms, the manly 
discipline of orders given and orders obeyed, the simple logic of the hierarchical 
command, confirms for men what they long suspect, that women are peripheral, 
irrelevant to the world that counts, passive spectators to the action in the center 
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The military not only tolerates, but encourages this sexist, hyper-masculine 
behavior among its soldiers in East Asia by facilitating recreational sex between 
the soldiers and the local women, practically institutionalizing prostitution in the 
host countries under such euphemisms as "hospitality industry," "rest and relax," 
or simply "entertainment.,,205 The tragic result is the birth of tens of thousands of 
unwanted, mixed-race children, like Nguyen, born out of wedlock. Depending on 
the culture or social climate of the country in which these children are born, the 
familiar cycle of abandonment, poverty, illiteracy, and crime may start allover 
again--except next time the focus will have merely shifted from Vietnamese 
Amerasians to Amerasians from another country.206 
Given Congress's plenary power in the area of immigration, and the Supreme 
Court's hands-off approach to this area of the law, Congress is clearly in the best 
position among the three federal branches to remedy this semi-worldwide problem. 
Ideally, Congress should enact another major piece of legislation like the 
Homecoming Act inviting Amerasians who remain in Vietnam207 and other East 
Asian countries to come to the United States. After their arrival, Congress should 
grant them automatic citizenship without requiring the Amerasians to first locate 
and reunite with their American fathers.208 
ring ... as the American presence in Vietnam multiplied, the unspoken military 
theory of women's bodies not only as a reward of war but as a necessary 
provision like soda pop and ice cream to keep our boys healthy and happy, 
turned into routine practice. And if monetary access to women's bodies did not 
promote an ideology of rape in Vietnam, neither did it thwart it. 
English, supra note 75, at 60 (quoting SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, 
WOMEN AND RAPE 32,33, 92 (1970)). 
205 English, supra note 75, at 61. 
206 See Bonnie Kae Grover, Note, Aren't These Our Children? Vietnamese Amerasian 
Resettlement and Restitution, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'y & L. 247, 274 (1995) ("While the 
youngest of the Vietnamese Amerasians are young adults today, a younger generation of 
Amerasians is growing up in other countries."). 
207 See YARBOROUGH, supra note 78, at 224-25 (noting that although the 
Homecoming Act is officially still in effect, emigrating under the Act "is almost impossible 
now"). 
208 Without some sort of proof of paternity, it is very difficult if not impossible to 
prove that an Amerasian has any biological ties to a United States national (her physical 
appearance notwithstanding) to confer United States citizenship on to her. However, as 
discussed in Part II.C and elsewhere in this Note, it is also very difficult if not impossible 
for an Amerasian to even locate let alone reunite with her American father after many years 
of separation; in many cases, the father may have died on the battlefields long ago, he may 
not be located, or he may simply refuse to acknowledge the relationship. There might not 
be a complete resolution to this conflict. However, it is logical to say that, if an Amerasian 
has been admitted into the United States through a rigorous program like the Homecoming 
Act (including the requisite face-to-face interview(s) with United States personnel 
overseas), they would carry with them the presumption of being the son or daughter of a 
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As a less-burdensome alternative, Congress should grant automatic 
citizenship to those Amerasians who had already resettled in the United States 
through the Homecoming Act. The reasoning behind this is best captured through 
statements made by Representative Zoe Lofgren, who in 2005 reintroduced the 
Amerasian Naturalization Act, a bill that seeks to do precisely what is proposed 
here and is currently pending in the House:209 
[T]hese individuals have lived through devastation during war, have been 
mistreated by their governments because of their mixed race, and many 
now live in the United States, but only as legal permanent residents. 
There is no doubt that Amerasians are the sons and daughters of 
American fathers. Our. Ame.riean government already made that 
determination when we admitted the.m to the United States as legal 
permanent residents .... 
. . . It is time for us to finally close a chapter in our history that has 
too long denied Amerasians the opportunity to become citizens and be 
recognized as the Americans that they are.2IO 
An even less-burdensome alternative is for Congress to revise the deportation 
rules for Amerasians to make deportation less common. Deportation is a harsh 
measure, whether the courts view it as punishment or not; to liberally impose it on 
persons who are genetically tied to the United States, and who are by accident of 
birth mistreated by their native government and people, heightens the harshness of 
the measure. Also, as seen above, when the United States passed the 1982 
Amerasian Amendments and subsequently the Homecoming Act, it was in large 
part influenced by the realization that its Amerasian children were living through 
terrible conditions under Vietnam's repressive post-war communist regime. This 
United States national. Unlike other immigrants who are admitted into the United States for 
a variety of other reasons, but who must establish further ties to the United States before 
they can become a naturalized citizen, an Amerasian who has been admitted into the 
United States would already have a presumed biological tie to the United States. This, 
among other reasons, supports granting Amerasians automatic citizenship, bypassing the 
usual naturalization process. See Brief of Equality Now and Others as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 11 n.8, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071), 2000 
WL 1702031 (noting that the law of many countries provides for transmission of 
citizenship through fathers rather than mothers; therefore, section 309 operating in 
conjunction with the law of these countries could cause many children who are born out of 
wedlock to be stateless); see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) 
(recognizing that the avoidance of statelessness is an "issue of the utmost import"). 
209 See supra note 138. 
210 151 CONGo REc. Ell19-01 (daily ed. May 26, 2005) (statement of Sen. Lofgren), 
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-binlgetpage.cgi?dbname=2005_record& 
page=Ell19&position=all. 
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realization informed the United States government's original intention to classify 
Amerasians as "refugees" under the Homecoming Act; and although it did not 
carry out this intention, the United States treated Amerasians like designated 
refugees nonetheless.211 
Ultimately, Congress should tackle the source of the problem: the sexist 
mentality and sexual escapades of United States troops stationed abroad. Congress 
should open a serious dialogue with the Pentagon and encourage it to clean up its 
act, perhaps through incentives. Alternatively, Congress should mandate the 
Pentagon's compliance by passing legislation expressly forbidding prostitution 
overseas and providing serious criminal penalties for those who aid in or abet such 
activity.212 If these troops decide to have irresponsible sex with women abroad, 
they should at least be responsible for the children they subsequently create. 
Imposing childrearing, or at least financial, responsibilities on these troops would 
provide a disincentive for them to carelessly conceive and then abandon children 
while simultaneously treating foreign women as mere sex objects. By taking such 
action, the United States would be in a better position to hold itself out as a moral 
leader of the world, and would demonstrate to the international community that it 
is a nation that cares for its children. 
211 See supra note 105. 
212 Prostitution certainly does not have to be a necessary or inherent aspect of war or 
the military, as it is controllable. See Chang, supra note 57, at 642-43 (noting that during 
the Persian Gulf War, when U.S. troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. military 
took that country's "sanctions against prostitution seriously" and that '''even before a 
soldier could go near a local woman and get caught by Arabs [U.S. military personnel 
would] get him' " (citation omitted)). 
